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Abstract 
Resources for foreign aid come under attack when parties that care little for international 
affairs come to power. Internationally focused parties of the left and right, however, prefer to 
use aid as a tool to pursue their foreign policy goals. Yet varying goals based on left-right 
ideology differentiate the way donors use foreign aid. We leverage sector aid to test 
hypotheses from our Partisan Theory of Aid Allocation and find support for the idea that 
domestic political preferences affect foreign aid behavior. Left-internationalist governments 
increase disaster aid, while parochial counterparts cut spending on budget assistance and aid 
that bolsters recipients' trade viability. Conservative governments favor trade-boosting aid. 
We find consistent, nuanced, evidence for our perspective from a series of Error Correction 
Models and extensive robustness checks. By connecting theories of foreign aid to domestic 
politics, our approach links prominent, but often disconnected, fields of political research and 
raises important questions for policymakers interested in furthering the efficacy of 
development aid. 
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Foreign aid offers a potent instrument to incentivize recipient OHDGHUV¶EHKDYLRU, but its 
effectiveness has long been questioned.1 For many scholars, DLG¶Vpatchy record in promoting 
democratization, growth, and cooperation stems from moral hazard and geopolitics: donors' 
strategic incentives diverted aid flows from the neediest or most deserving states and damaged 
their credibility. Analysis focused on which donor-states fell into this trap (Berthélemy and 
Tichit 2004), and on aid's expanded utility after the Cold War (Bearce and Tirone 2010). New 
                                                          
1 For a typology of "returns" to donor states, see Dudley and Montmarquette (1976). Morgenthau's (1962) essay 
exemplifies aid-for-policy skepticism. 
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research, however, seeks to explain variation in aid efforts within countries over time. These 
studies open up the democratic donor state, substituting the domestic political preferences of 
governments for the amorphous "national interest", but find mixed support thus far (e.g. Noël 
and Therién 1995; Fleck and Kilby 2010; Dreher, Nunnenkamp and Schmaljohann 2014). 
Yet, foreign aid allocations likely reflect the goals of domestic decision-makers and 
consequently the preferences of key actors should influence foreign aid outputs (Tingley 
2010, Milner and Tingley 2010, Fleck and Kilby 2010, Dreher, et al. 2014).  
We consider how partisan ideological preferences affect GRQRUV¶allocation decisions 
across the array of foreign assistance sectors. We argue WKDWSDUWLHV¶SUHIHUHQFHVSUHGLFWWKHLU
approach to foreign affairs. Changes in the preferences of governing parties produce shifts in 
allocation across aid types. Focusing on the effect of ideology on the most frequently used aid 
sectors allows detailed predictions that would be obscured by aggregate trends.2 Our 
perspective dovetails with studies of party politics and public policy, where scholars 
recognize that policies and budgets reflect political processes (Soroka and Wlezien 2010; 
Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2010; Bevan and Greene 2015; Whitten and Williams 2011). 
Elections and coalition negotiations create governments with varying preferences over 
multiple dimensions of politics (Laver and Shepsle 1996). 
Our theory relaxes strong assumptions about traditional left-right ideology by 
introducing a second dimension: internationalism. This dimension captures governments' 
preferences for engaging and influencing foreign countries relative to isolationism. This 
dimension has become increasingly salient in donors' domestic politics. Internationalism 
varies across parties with otherwise similar ideology and within parties over time. Donald 
Trump¶VYLHZVRQDLGDQGWUDGHIRUH[DPSOHVWURQJO\FRQWUDVWWKRVHRIWKH2012 Republican 
                                                          
2 Theorizing at the aggregate level opens researchers up to ecological fallacy if meaningful sectoral differences 
EDVHGRQGRQRUV¶OHIW-right preferences exist.  
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Party candidate, Mitt Romney (The New York Times 2012, Thoma 2016).3 The absence of 
this dimension from prior work may partially explain inconsistent results across analyses 
using left-right dichotomies and aggregate aid flows (e.g. Noël and Therién 1995; Fleck and 
Kilby 2010, Dreher, et al. 2014). 
Adding internationalism allows us to identify preferences of four ideal-types of 
parties:  left-pro-international, left-anti-international, right-pro-international, and right-anti-
international. We predict that internationalist governments likely use foreign aid as a tool of 
influence. Subsequent changes in aid allocations will reflect variation in preferences, as 
governments choose types of recipients and aid channels. Thus, we derive predictions 
regarding aid provision across stated purposes.4 For example, a country can target aid to civil 
society or economic sectors depending on their left-right preferences for policy.  
 We test hypotheses from the Partisan Theory of Foreign Aid Allocation with data on 
parties¶SULRULWLHVIRUIRUHLJQDLGIURPWKH&RPSDUDWLYH0DQLIHVWRV3URMHFW&03, 
government composition from ParlGov (Döring and Manow 2012), and aid allotments from 
AidData (Tierney, et al. 2011). Analysis of 28 donor countries over nearly 40 years supports 
an explanation that incorporates ideological preferences. Internationalist governments pursue 
economic agendas through aid allocations that reflect their partisan preferences. We submit 
our results to a wide range of robustness checks, including alternate modeling and 
measurement strategies in the online appendix.  
                                                          
3 Successive Republican Party Platforms shifted language about aid. Initially, they ³FDOO>HG@Ior the development 
RIDVWUDWHJ\IRUIRUHLJQDVVLVWDQFHWKDWVHUYHVRXUQDWLRQDOLQWHUHVW«VWUHQJWKHQ>V@WKHQRQ-military tools to 
IXUWKHURXUQDWLRQDOVHFXULW\JRDOV«´,QWKHSDUW\SURSRVHG³>l]imiting foreign aid spending helps 
keep taxes lower, which frees more resources in the private and charitable sectors, whose giving tends to be 
PRUHHIIHFWLYHDQGHIILFLHQW´7KHWRQHFKDQJHGDJDLQLQ³>I@oreign assistance programs must not only 
project the best of American values, but must work to create self-sustainability and leverage the resources and 
FDSDFLW\RIWKHSULYDWHVHFWRU´ 
4 Pursued elsewhere, our theory also suggests variation recipient type. 
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 This study holds implications for theories of political development, foreign influence, 
partisan politics, and democratic accountability. Our theory suggests an additional explanation 
for DLG¶Vfailure to induce behavior from recipient states. This lack of success partially reflects 
aid's politicized nature and the conditions under which it is given. The donor credibility 
problem, here, stems from domestic political competition rather than the global balance of 
power. The timing, amount, and nature of aid allocated should not depend on the politics of 
the donor country, lest recipients perceive funds as tools of political manipulation.  
Furthermore, theories of representative democracy require representatives to pursue 
campaign statements. Studies often find weak evidence of partisan priorities affecting policy 
change (e.g. Bevan, John and Jennings 2011). Our findings, however, suggest parties pursue 
their stated goals. Previous research may miss nuanced effects of preferences on foreign 
policy, as we find that short- and long-term effects may differ. Moreover, foreign aid's effect 
on goals such as democracy promotion and developing foreign markets for trade manifest 
over time. More broadly, evidence suggests partisan governments pursue priorities consistent 
with their electoral statements, even in the realm of foreign policy. 
 
Preferences and Government Policy 
6FKRODUVOLQNSDUWLHV¶ideology to government behavior. Research predicts budgets and 
policy via HLWKHUWKHJRDOVRISDUWLHV¶VXSSRUWHUVRUVWDWHPHQWVIURPWKHLUFDPSDLJQV(Hibbs 
1977). While much research emphasizes competition on the traditional left-right economic 
dimension of politics, parties stake out independent positions on a diversity of issues, 
including the environment, immigration, and foreign intervention (Lowe, et al. 2011, de Vries 
and Hobolt 2012). Domestic electoral competition forces governments to outline preferences 
on diverse issues, while incentivizing a reputation of accountability for their statements. 
Parties balance their sincere preferences against office-seeking goals (Strøm 1990). 
Electoral competition encourages parties to shift preferences in response to public opinion 
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(Adams, Haupt and Stoll 2009), issue-focused parties' success (Meguid 2008), competitors' 
policy changes, and economic conditions (Williams, Seki and Whitten 2016)9RWHUV¶
responses to these shifts, however, are often delayed (Somer-Topcu 2009). 
Electoral and intra-party motives drive party manifesto content. Parties select issues 
because of historically positive associations (Petrocik 1996, Egan 2013), or to match 
traditional supporters' preferences (Hibbs 1977). Ideologically extreme and governing parties 
incorporate new topics (de Vries and Hobolt 2012, Schumacher, de Vries and Vis 2013). 
Parties emphasize topics to appear responsive (Sigelman and Buell 2004, Spoon and Klüver 
2014). Past government experience, economic conditions and the diversity of their 
parliamentary delegation and leadership all influence tKHEUHDGWKRILVVXHVLQSDUWLHV¶
campaigns (Greene 2016, Greene and O'Brien 2016).  
Varied motives drive parties to address topics beyond the traditional left-right 
cleavage, such as foreign policy. The electoral context encourages parties to focus on 
economic foreign policy, or broader goals (e.g. Hellwig 2012; Greene 2016; Williams et al. 
2016). Distinguishing preferences on such issues from those on the economic dimension 
allows researchers to account for the complexity of party competition and policy change 
inside democracies. 
 Upon entering office, parties pursue policy consistent with electoral statements to 
maintain a positive reputation. Research connecting electoral statements to behavior in 
government describes a complex OLQNDJHEHWZHHQSDUWLHV¶JRDOVDQGSROLF\-making behaviors. 
For example, parties campaign on and formulate budgets emphasizing the goals of their 
primary electoral constituencies (Hibbs 1977). Even in the context of coalition or divided 
government, parties fulfill many electoral pledges (Thomson 2001, 2011), and pursue policies 
and budgets consistent with their goals (Alesina and Rosenthal 1995, Schmidt 1996). Parties 
pursue control of cabinet positions and engage in oversight of ideologically distant ministers 
on their issue priorities (Bäck, Debus and Dumont 2011, Greene and Jensen 2016). 3DUWLHV¶
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may face substantial hurdles to implementing their policy priorities, but dedicate resources 
consistent with their electoral appeals nonetheless (Tsebelis 2002; Soroka and Wlezien 2010; 
Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2010). Further, their responses to changing events depend on 
their policy priorities (Bevan and Greene 2016, 2017).  
Research on competition and accountability suggests that parties hold distinct 
preferences across diverse issues. They pursue policy in line with these statements in 
parliament and through budgetary decisions. Building on this approach, we propose the 
Partisan Theory of Foreign Aid Allocation, incorporating multi-dimensional policy 
preferences and varying foreign aid types. 
 
A Partisan Theory of Foreign Aid Allocation 
Foreign aid transfers capital from rich to poor states. Governments use aid to achieve 
outcomes. Donor goals vary from geostrategic coalition-building, to pursuit of new markets 
for imports. Generous-mindedness is possible, too; tKHGHVLUHGRXWFRPHPD\EH³«VRPH
indication that they [donors] have had a favorable impact on the residents of the recipient 
FRXQWU\´(Dudley and Montmarquette 1976, 133).  
'RQRUV¶goals drive patterns of aid allocation. If economic goals predominate, then 
trade partners likely to import goods from the donor should receive more aid. If geopolitical 
strategy drives donors, then alliance partners, those near to rivals, or possessed of valuable 
natural resources should garner a larger share of aid flows. If a desire to improve recipients' 
lives propels policy, then governments most in need of and most likely to properly utilize 
additional resources should see more aid. The empirical literature supports these arguments, 
though many lament the relative power of trade and geopolitical incentives over 
humanitarianism (Collier and Dollar 2002, Berthélemy and Tichit 2004, Berthélemy 2006, 
Stone 2006, Fuchs, Nunnenkamp and Öhler 2015). Milner and Tingley (2010) find 
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particularly strong support for the role of economic LQFHQWLYHVLQ$PHULFDQOHJLVODWRUV¶
preferences, tracing their votes on IRUPVRIDLGWRWKHLUGLVWULFWV¶UHVRXUFHHQGRZPHQWV 
Much of this literature, however, examines cross-donor variation in aid allocation (e.g. 
Dietrich 2016). To explain changes in aid distribution within donors, scholars examine ruling 
SDUWLHV¶ideologies. Many draw a parallel between domestic preference for redistribution and 
willingness to transfer wealth to less developed countries (Noël and Therién 1995, Therién 
and Noël 2000, Tingley 2010). Findings regarding the relative generosity of leftist (or social-
democratic) parties vary across sample and method of estimation (Fuchs, Dreher and 
Nunnenkamp 2014). Sometimes leftist parties appear more generous (Tingley 2010); other 
times conservative governments allocate more (Goldstein and Moss 2005, Dreher, 
Nunnenkamp and Schmaljohann 2015). Some evidence suggests rather, that liberal and 
conservative actors send aid for different reasons (Milner and Tingley 2010, Fleck and Kilby 
2006, 2010, Brech and Potrafke 2014).  
We contribute to this emerging literature, linking ideology to foreign aid preferences. 
PDUWLHV¶SROLF\JRDOVSOD\DQLPSRUWDQWUROHLQWKHIRUPXODWLRQRIIRUHLJQDLGSURJUDPV 
Considering parties' preferences for foreign involvement explains variance in donor behavior. 
TKHHIIHFWRISDUWLHV¶SUHIHUHQFHVLVPRUHFRPSOH[WKDQpreviously suggested; the relative 
VWUHQJWKRIDFWRUV¶LGHRORJLHVDQGGHVLUHWREHFRPHLQWHUQDWLRQDOO\HQJDJHGimply varying 
affinity for types of foreign aid that serve different political goals (e.g. humanitarian versus 
budget aid). Incorporating preferences over foreign intervention and sectoral aid will explain 
previously inconclusive evidence for left-right allocation patterns. 
Previous scholarship equates domestic preferences for redistribution of wealth (leftist 
ideology) with willingness to redistribute wealth internationally (Noël and Therién 1995; 
Therién and Noël 2000). While we agree that leftist economic ideology affects donor 
preferences over foreign aid, we also believe this assumption ignores variation in the rationale 
behind aid. One need not believe in economic and social justice to see foreign aid as a useful 
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policy tool, particularly for aid allocated to sectors such as budget support or trade factors. 
Conservative governments have plenty of reasons to support foreign aid: economic growth 
promotes WKHGHYHORSPHQWRIQHZPDUNHWVIRUDFRXQWU\¶VSURGXFWVDQGVHUYLFHV; contributing 
to international efforts earns the state more influence in IOs; charity creates a favorable 
reputation that appeals to conservative social values.  
We propose that attitudes towards foreign affairs or, internationalism, constitute an 
important factor in models of donor behavior. Parties of both the left and right may see 
foreign aid as an expedient tool to pursue policy goals abroad, depending on their preferences 
for engaging with the wider world. Part of aid's expedience, however, stems from the different 
goals it can be tailored to serve. 
Incorporating economic ideology with internationalism produces four ideal party 
types:  left-pro-international, right-pro-international, left-anti-international, and right-anti-
international. Left-right ideology encapsulates preferences relevant for predicting variance in 
sectoral aid allocations. Although often initially defined by its emergence from class conflicts 
(e.g. labor versus capital groups; Lipset and Rokkan 1960), left-right ideology also contains 
and organizes disagreements on a range of topics such as social, morality or education 
policies. The exact content of the left-right dimension differs across contexts, but generally 
reflects broadly prescribed responses to social, economic and political inequality (e.g. (Mair 
2007). Left-leaning positions emphasize the role of governments in decreasing economic 
inequality; more rightist positions tolerate inequality in the name of economic development 
and market liberalization (Huber and Inglehart 1995, Bakker, Jolly and Polk 2012). While 
most associate the left-ULJKWGLPHQVLRQZLWKHFRQRPLFFRQIOLFW³DWWLWXGHVWRJHQGHUWRWKH
SROLFHWRWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDORUGHU«IRUPDQLQWULQVLFHOHPHQWRIWKDWGLPHQVLRQ´0Dir 2007, 
215; see also (Budge and Robertson 1987). Overall, preferences for economic, gender, social 
and political equality will lead leftist governments to use aid types that reduce inequalities 
8 
 
abroad, while more conservative governments design aid packages for broad economic 
growth.   
The internationalism dimension refers to preferences for engagement versus insularity. 
A pro-international party champions international organizations, looks to the international 
community for legitimacy, and seeks a greater role in international affairs. Consider the 
%ULWLVK&RQVHUYDWLYHSDUW\¶VGHFODUDWLRQ 
3URWHFWLQJ%ULWDLQ¶VHQOLJKWHQHGQDWLRQDOLQWHUHVWUHTXLUHVJOREDOHQJDJHPHQW:HZLOO
be safer if our values are strongly upheld and widely respected in the world. Our 
national identity is bound up in our historic global role as an outward-looking nation, 
giving generously to developing countries, and providing a safe haven to genuine 
refugees (Conservative Party Manifesto 2010, 109). 
 
An anti-international party emphasizes the costs of international entanglements, demanding 
greater focus on domestic matters and reduced obligations abroad. The Australian Liberal 
Party's Federal Platform, for example, offers this more guarded statement about global 
engagement: "Liberals recognise the growing influence of globalisation but guard the 
sovereignty of our nation" (Liberal Party of Australia 2015, 15). Indeed, the SDUW\¶V entire 
2015 foreign policy statement contains less than 200 words.   
Table 1 summarizes our conceptualization of the intersection between economic 
ideology and internationalism. Integrating these dimensions produces meaningful distinctions. 
7KH%ULWLVK&RQVHUYDWLYH3DUW\¶VHPSKDVLVRQLQWHUQDWLRQDOLQIOXHQFHILWVZHOl with a rightist 
pro-international agenda, prioritizing GLSORPDWLFHIIRUWVWRIXUWKHU%ULWDLQ¶V³«FXOWXUH
HGXFDWLRQFRPPHUFHDQGVHFXULW\´/DERXU¶VPDQLIHVWRexemplifies a leftist pro-
international party, HPSKDVL]LQJ³>W@KHJOREDOSRYHUW\HPHUJHQF\´DQGUHIRUPLQJ
international organizations to favor inclusiveness (Labour Party Manifesto 2010, 10.6). 
Foreign policy statements can be prominent, such as 7UXPS¶VUHFHQWFDOOVIRUUHGXFLQJ
foreign aid versus CliQWRQ¶VDSSHDOVIRUJUHDWHULQWHUQDWLRQDOLQWHUYHQWLRQ (Thoma 2016). 
Upon entering office, parties seek to appear responsible and accountable. Even if foreign 
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policy is a secondary division, election campaigns often include strong reform pledges.5  For 
example, the British Conservative party in 2010 included a foreign policy section which 
declared, ³:HZLOOHQJDJHSRVLWLYHO\WKHZRUOGWRGHHSHQDOOLDQFHVDQGEXLOGQHZ
SDUWQHUVKLSV:HZLOOUHIRUPLQWHUQDWLRQDOLQVWLWXWLRQVKHOSWKRVHLQQHHG«´&RQservative 
Party Manifesto, 2010).  
<<<Table 1 Here>>> 
Manipulating aid allocations provides a relatively easy demonstration of commitment 
to foreign affairs.6 The Conservative Party manifesto later explains WKDW³«ZHVKRXOGXVHWKLV
opportunity to reaffirm«RXUYDOXHV± which is why we will continue to increase the level of 
%ULWLVKDLG´ (Conservative Party Manifesto, 2010). Aid can be used to further many goals; it is 
customizable. Donors manipulate not just how much aid their government sends, but to which 
countries, what purposes, and which recipient actors the funds accrue. The U.S. Republican 
Party platform of 2012 contains a potent example, directly contrasting its vision for the use of 
foreign aid with the incumbent democratic government's:  
The effectiveness of our foreign aid has been limited by the cultural agenda of the 
current Administration, attempting to impose on foreign countries« legalized abortion 
and the homosexual rights agenda. At the same time, faith-based groups²the sector 
that has had the best track record in promoting lasting development²have been 
H[FOXGHGIURPJUDQWVEHFDXVHWKH\ZLOOQRWFRQIRUPWRWKHDGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶VVRFLDO
agenda. We will reverse this tragic course, encourage more involvement by the most 
effective aid organizations, and trust developing peoples to build their future from the 
ground up (Republican National Committee 2012, 46).  
 
Hence, we expect internationalist governments to adjust more than just the amount of aid. To 
align international assistance programs with their preferences, parties will also alter the goals 
that aid dollars serve. In practice, this means changing the type of foreign aid allocated.  
                                                          
5 Parties often include statements that suggest strong preferences for international influence, distinct from 
economic principles.  
6 Several scholars assume speedy alteration of foreign aid allocations after governmental change (Tingley 2010, 
Fleck and Kilby 2006, Cox and Duffin 2008). 
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The Partisan Theory of Foreign Aid produces nuanced expectations regarding both the 
types of programs favored by donors and the recipients to which more funds will flow. Here, 
we develop the first set of expectations: how do pro-international governments of different 
ideology differ in the types of aid favored?7 Table 2 summarizes our expectations. 
If left pro-international parties favor economic justice and equality (e.g. Mair 2007), 
then they may choose to allocate more aid overall as argued by some in the literature. 
However, they may also attempt to allocate aid that reduces economic or social inequality 
(Fleck and Kilby 2006). We consider disaster assistance, here, as a metric of need. To tap the 
social-justice angle of leftist ideology, we consider aid to non-status quo actors.  
Disaster and humanitarian assistance comprise a significant component of aid budgets. 
At first glance, stochastic events ± earthquakes, drought, and disease outbreaks ± determine 
this flow. Such processes drive much of the volatility in aid receipt (Hudson and Mosley 
2008). Natural disasters provide a clear indicator of economic deprivation and need. 
Typically, NGOs on the ground administer humanitarian funds and supplies, limiting 
embezzlement by recipient states. This aid potently symbolizes a left-international 
government's support for reducing economic and social deprivation. Conversely, a left-
international government that ignored international disasters may draw constituents¶LUH.  This 
form of aid, therefore, fits particularly well with the goals ascribed to leftist governments.  
Confronted with failure to promote democracy and growth, many donors seek to 
bypass recipient governments, by directly funding non-status quo groups.8 Those concerned 
WKDWGHSHQGHQFHRQIRUHLJQDFWRUVIRUUHYHQXHZHDNHQV³YHUWLFDODFFRXQWDELOLW\´LQUHFLSLHQWV
allowing the powerful to further enrich themselves at the expense of the poor (Boone 1996), 
                                                          
7 Testing the second set of expectations requires an alternative data structure and empirical strategy. As such this 
is best pursued separately. 
8 'LHWULFK¶V(2016) work suggests type of political economy mediates the likelihood of bypass. 
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may prefer directly funding civil society and non-executive actors.9 Sometimes called 
³GHPRFUDF\DLG´ (Scott and Steele 2011, Resnick 2012), these transfers include programs to 
establish and strengthen independent electoral commissions, increase voter registration and 
political participation, train and oversee police and legal processes, and promote human rights 
and race and gender equality. Pursuing these goals coordinates with leftist's preoccupation 
with political and social inequality by strengthening institutional frameworks that ensure 
representation in government (Therién and Noël 2000). Money sent through such channels 
may look more legitimate to leftist constituencies skeptical of democratizing governments and 
business interests. 
This discussion produces the following testable expectations.   
H1a: More leftist and internationalist governing parties will allocate more aid to non-
status quo actors inside recipients. 
H1b: More leftist and internationalist governing parties will allocate more resources to 
disaster aid.  
 
Rightist internationally-minded parties should also use foreign aid liberally. However, 
their strategy differs substantively from pro-international left governments; preferences for 
economic growth, liberalized markets, traditional moral and social values, and overall greater 
tolerance for inequality motivate their choices (e.g. Mair 2007; Volkens et al. 2011). 
Consequently, we expect right-pro-international parties employ aid to cultivate new markets 
for capital-intensive exports (Milner and Tingley 2010, Fuchs, Nunnenkamp and Öhler 2015), 
curry favor with geopolitically relevant states (Dreher, Sturm and Vreeland 2009, Dreher, 
Sturm and Vreeland 2009b, Kuziemko and Werker 2006), and gain influence over targeted 
leaders (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2007, 2009). These motives may produce equivalent 
                                                          
9 An established branch of the literature posits that aid flows may be anaORJRXVWRRWKHU³XQHDUQHGLQFRPH´ 
(Smith 2008, Morrison 2009, Ahmed 2012, Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2013). Recent work, however, 
questions this argument theoretically and empirically (Atlincekic and Bearce 2014) 
12 
 
aggregate aid spending across sectors that encourage liberalization and opening of foreign 
economies (with fewer protections for specific industries) and support more traditional social 
policies and dominant groups.10 
Milner and Tingley (2010) find evidence of variation in preferences for aid allocation 
in the U.S. Congress based on the prevalence of heavy-capital industries across 
constituencies. At the national level, we expect rightist governments use aid to support export 
oriented businesses. Contrasting governments that emphasize reducing inequalities, rightist 
governments might funnel aid towards projects to increase the viability of recipient markets 
for goods. This can be partially accomplished by boosting the economic capacity of potential 
trade partners. A vast swathe of the purpose codes identified by the OECD and Aid Data 
suggest this motivation.  
Rightist parties might also pursue "aid-for policy" deals (Bueno de Mesquita and 
Smith 2009). Just as those concerned about the neediest within recipient countries eschew 
budget aid as potentially fungible and injurious to their purposes, donors looking to purchase 
influence may prize program support as the most effective tool (Resnick 2012; Dreher, 
Nunnenkamp and Thiele 2008). Less preoccupied by economic inequality, rightist 
governments value budget aid's potential to induce reforms beneficial to donor capitol groups. 
Aid that helps recipients spend on what they choose and bolsters their trade ability has 
symbolic value. It signals donor support of recipient governments, easing future requests for 
favors relevant to economic, geopolitical or other goals.  
We should, then, expect the following hypotheses to hold.  
H2a: Government parties that are more rightist and internationalist will allocate more 
aid to budget-support. 
                                                          
10 We do not believe, however, that left-international governments are saintly immune from geopolitical and 
economic interests. Rather, their ideology produces incentives which offset the utility of aid for more cynical or 
commercial purposes.  
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H2b: Governing parties that are more rightist and internationalist will allocate more 
aid to trade support (such as factor-production programs). 
 
Given their ideological propensities, we expect left and right governments on the anti-
international side not to increase aid allocations of any type. Inward-looking governments 
deprioritize influence over foreign countries in ways that are consistent with other aspects of 
their ideology. Our expectations, then, require that we allow internationalism to condition the 
effect of ideology on aid flows.  
Altogether, we expect that relative differences in ideology produce prominent 
differences in governments'foreign aid distribution. Left-international governments allocate 
resources to aid that reduces economic, social and political inequalities, whereas more right-
international governments use aid to develop market access and trading partners. Focusing 
only on the total amount of aid wRXOGPXGGOHLGHRORJ\¶VHIIHFW and produce inconsistent 
empirical findings across samples. Therefore, we focus our analysis on differences in foreign 
aid sectors.   
<<<Table 2 Here>>> 
 
Data and Methods 
 We construct a set of aid allocations for 28 donors from 1974 to 2010.11  Using 
AidData 2.1 (Tierney, et al. 2011), we aggregate aid flows by purpose codes, creating a series 
of dependent variables appropriate for each hypothesis. We model the time-series cross-
sectional nature of these dependent variables using Error Correction Models (ECM) with 
panel corrected standard errors. ECMs allow testing for both short- and long-term effects of 
the key independent variables while accounting for autoregressive processes. The results are 
                                                          
11 Sectoral aid data reporting begins in 1973, limiting temporal domain. Donor reporting practices and extant 
democratic competition limit our sample, leaving us with 28 donors. Eastern European and others, such as Spain, 
enter after democratization. See donor list in Table A2. 
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comparable to the first difference model used by Tingley 2010, but include lagged values of 
the independent variables (Best 2012).12 Specifically, our ECMs take this form: 13 
 
  ?ࢅ௞ǡ௜ǡ௧ǡ௧ିଵ ൌ  ࢻ૙ ൅ ࢻ૚ࢅ௞ǡ௜ǡ௧ିଵ ൅ ࢼ൫ ?ܫ݊ݐ݁ݎ݊ܽݐ݅݋݈݊ܽ݅ݏ ௜݉ǡ௧ǡ௧ିଵ ൅ܫ݊ݐ݁ݎ݊ܽݐ݅݋݈݊ܽ݅ݏ݉௜ǡ௧ିଵ ൅  ?ܫ݀݁݋݈݋݃ݕ௜ǡ௧ǡ௧ିଵ ൅ ܫ݀݁݋݈݋݃ݕ௜ǡ௧ିଵ ൅  ?ܫ݀݁݋݈݋݃ݕ௜ǡ௧ǡ௧ିଵ ൈ ?ܫ݊ݐ݁ݎ݊ܽݐ݅݋݈݊ܽ݅ݏ ௜݉ǡ௧ǡ௧ିଵ ൅ ܫ݀݁݋݈݋݃ݕ௜ǡ௧ିଵ ൈ ܫ݊ݐ݁ݎ݊ܽݐ݅݋݈݊ܽ݅ݏ݉௜ǡ௧ିଵ ൅ ?ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௜ǡ௧ǡ௧ିଵ ൅ ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௜ǡ௧ିଵ൯ ൅ ߝ௜௧ . 
 
(1) 
    
In Equation 1, Y is a series of dependent variables containing the donor, i's, yearly 
total aid allocations in a sector, k. Each dependent variable measures aid allocations for the 
specified purpose in constant 2009 US$. Sectors include:  Aid to Non-Status Quo (SQ) 
Actors, Disaster Aid, Budget Aid, Trade-factor Aid, and Economic Infrastructure Aid. We 
identify aid flows appropriate to each sector via $LG'DWD¶VSXUSRVHVFKHPe. For Aid to Non-
64$FWRUVZHIODJSURMHFWVDLPHGDW³6WUHQJWKHQLQJFLYLOVRFLHW\´³Legal and Judicial 
'HYHORSPHQW´³:RPHQLQ'HYHORSPHQW´DQG ³6XSSRUWWR1DWLRQDO,QWHUQDWLRQDORU/RFDO
and Regional Non-Governmental OrganizatLRQV´14 Disaster and humanitarian aid have their 
RZQFDWHJRU\%XGJHW$LGLVVLPLODUO\HDV\WRLVRODWHDVLWLVGHVFULEHGGLUHFWO\DV³*HQHUDO
%XGJHW6XSSRUW´FRGH:Hcount DOO³3URGXFWLRQ6HFWRU´DLGDVTrade-factor Aid.15 
                                                          
12 Donor fixed effects are an alternative. Fixed effects, however, cannot model short- and long-term effects of 
key variables and may create multicollinearity with government ideology variables in contexts of irregular 
government change. We report a donor-year fixed effects model in Table A4. 
13 The Appendix contains many robustness checks, including mixed effects with varying slopes for the donor 
country and cabinet levels, Seemingly Unrelated Regression models, fixed effects models, and ECMs with 
varying sets of controls and operationalizations of the key variables. The results largely match those presented in 
the text, although sometimes the primary variables drop below standard levels of significance. 
14 We flag all allocations included under purpose codes:  15130, 15150, 42010, 92010, 92020, or 92030. 
15 Production sectors include: agriculture, forestry, and fishing; industry, mining, and construction; trade policy 
and regulations; and tourism.  
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Finally, we identify aid intended to bolster economic capacity as "Economic Infrastructure 
and Services".16 A logarithmic transformation of each dependent variable improves model 
performance. 
We capture donor governments' policy preferences with the CMP (Volkens, et al. 
2011), using /RZHHWDO¶VORJJHGVFDOHRISDUWLHV¶OHIW-right placement to 
RSHUDWLRQDOL]HJRYHUQPHQWV¶EURDG policy goals. This measure accounts for a number of 
HFRQRPLFDQGVRFLDOSROLF\JRDOVWKDWGLVWLQJXLVKSDUWLHV¶JRDOVRQWKHPRVWLPSRUWDQW
dimension of conflict in most advanced industrial democracies (e.g. (Lipset and Rokkan 1967, 
Budge 1993, Bakker, Jolly and Polk 2012). We interact Left-Right (RILE) Ideology with a 
measure of the governments' preferences for engagement with the world to assess our 
conditional hypotheses. Parties farther left on the main dimension of conflict have more 
negative scores. We operationalize the second dimension using a logged scale of tKH&03¶V
codes for internationalism.17 Since pro-internationalism can be considered a "left" position, 
internationalism takes more negative values for parties that prefer international engagement. 
To avoid confusion in discussion below, then, we refer to this measure as Anti-
Internationalism.  
Aggregating the preferences of coalition governments and of parties in presidential 
systems requires some care. Strong arguments exist for and against using the political party of 
the executive to represent the "government's" position. Executives usually enjoy great latitude 
in implementing foreign policy. Coalition partners and opposition parties, though, attenuate 
                                                          
16 This includes the following subsectors: transport and storage; communications; energy generation and supply; 
banking and financial services; business and other services. 
17 &RGHVSHUDQGSHU7KHVHFDWHJRULHVLQFOXGHWKHSHUFHQWDJHRITXDVLVWDWHPHQWVUHIHUHQFLQJWKH³1HHG
for international co-operation; co-operation with specific countries other than those coded in 101; need for aid to 
developing countries; need for world planning of resources; need for international courts; support for any 
LQWHUQDWLRQDOJRDORUZRUOGVWDWHVXSSRUWIRU81´$SSHQGL[ 3 (Budge et al. 2001, p.4-5).  
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this freedom. To accommodate these concerns, we developed two versions of RILE and Anti-
Internationalism. The first uses the mean coalition party or legislature position, depending on 
system of government.18 The second uses the preference point of the prime minister or 
president.19 In the interest of space, we relegate the second set of results to the Appendix.  
<<<Figure 1 Here>>> 
Figure 1 plots mean coalition RILE and Anti-internationalism. The logged scale means 
neither dimension has a natural center position. This plot illustrates the four party types. 
Leftist parties that favor and abhor entanglements with the international community exist. 
Likewise, some economically conservative parties advocate strongly for engagement while 
others do not. Only a slight tendency for right parties to be less pro-international exists, with a 
correlation of 0.282.  
We include several controls to account for institutions, partisan arrangements and 
international conditions. Like Tingley (2010), we include the parliamentary strength of 
Christian Democrat and Social Democrats. Following Therién and Noëll's (2000) logic, we 
account for the range of preferences in parliament with the percentage of seats controlled by 
socialist, communist, and Christian democratic parties. 
Other controls address governments' ability to implement policy. The effective number 
of cabinet parties accounts for negotiations between multiple coalition partners. A clear 
SDUOLDPHQWDU\PDMRULW\LQFUHDVHVWKHFRDOLWLRQ¶Vpolicy influence, operationalized here as 
cabinet's parliamentary seat share.20 
                                                          
18 We use the majority party¶VSRVLWLRQ for single-party governments. 
19 Tingley (2010) also uses both. The measures of economic left-right position correlate at 0.8864; of 
internationalism, at 0.9015.  In the rare instances of a technocratic, non-partisan prime minister, we use the 
largest coalition party's position. 
20 Larger coalitions may increase intra-coalition disagreement (Bevan and Greene 2016). 
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&RXQWULHV¶HFRQRPLFFKDUDFWHULVWLFVDQGinternal conditions also influence aid 
allocation. We incorporate measures of economic openness to control for a link between more 
liberal trade preferences and aid (see McKinlay and Little 1977, Alesina and Dollar 2000, 
Heron 2008, Tingley 2010).21 Domestic economic conditions constrain aid allocations 
(Heinrich, Kobayashi and Bryant 2016), so we include real GDP (Gleditsch 2008). Finally, 
we incorporate geopolitical differences caused by the Cold War with a dummy variable 
flagging pre-1991 observations (Bearce and Tirone 2010). 
  
Analysis 
 We hypothesize that aid allocations depend on donor government preferences for both 
RILE and internationalism. The results are largely consistent with this perspective. In two 
cases, our expectations for RILE proved incorrect. But, in each category of aid, anti-
internationalism and RILE condition each other. In three of the five models, the constitutive 
coefficienWRQǻanti-internationalism is negative and statistically significant.   
<<<Table 3 Here>>> 
 Table 3 presents the ECM results. Each column corresponds to the regression on the 
named sector. Due to the interactions between our continuous measures of ideology and 
internationalism, and the ECM technique, each coefficient in the tables below provides highly 
conditional information.22 CRHIILFLHQWVIRUDYDULDEOH¶VOHYHODWWLPHt-1 indicate long-term 
effects, while the change coefficients speak to short term effects. Due to the interaction, the 
constituent coefficients for both the lagged and change variables indicate the effect of RILE 
(or its change) when internationalism (or its change) equals zero. Zero¶VVXEVWDQWLYHPHDQLQJ 
                                                          
21 Following Tingley (2010) we run robustness checks controlling for trade openness. Substantive results are 
similar, but the substantially reduced sample size inhibits key variables' levels of significance. 
22 See Best (2012) on the ECM approach. Williams and Whitten (2012) offer additional guidance regarding 
interpretation.  
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varies across the lagged and change variables. For lagged values, it means the zero point on 
the dimension, which is rare for RILE.23 For anti-internationalism, zero values are slightly 
more common and assigned when party manifestos provide no means of evaluating a pro- or 
anti-position.24 A zero value on the change variables, however, means no shift in preferences 
occurred between the current and previous time-period. The appropriate interpretation of the 
coefficient for change in anti-internationalism, then, is the short-term effect of an increase in 
parochialism absent a change in RILE from the previous period. The strong pattern of 
significant negative effects in these coefficients, then, signals support for our argument.    
<<<Table 4 Here>>> 
Due to the limited information conveyed by coefficients, we graph the marginal effect, 
in both the short- and long-term, for each preference dimension. For a more holistic view of 
the results, we also designed a simulation (similar to Williams and Whitten 2012) which 
compares aid allocations over time. The simulation begins with an "election" in two 
equivalent countries A and B.25  In both countries, elections bring in internationalist 
governments, two standard deviations to the left of average. Country A's new government has 
economic ideology scores two standard deviations to the left of the sample mean. In B, the 
new government's economic ideology lies two standard deviations to the right of the mean. 
Plugging in these values, we calculate the predicted outcome, i.e. the difference in aid 
allocated to each sector, for these two governments. The simulation proceeds as though these 
                                                          
23 Given the logged scale, zero is not a meaningful center point. 
24 In such cases, internationalism equals ln(0+0.5) ± ln(0+0.5) 
25 We use sample means for starting values for the lagged anti-internationalism and economic ideology variables, 
holding all other variables at mean or modal values for the simulation.  
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governments rule for five years.26 We repeat the simulation moving parties to the right on 
internationalism for more complete interpretation.27  
<<<Figure 2 Here>>> 
  Figures 2 and 3 report the marginal effects of RILE and anti-internationalism, 
respectively. The marginal effect gives the average increase in Y for an instantaneous increase 
in X, at each value of its conditioning variable. As both dimensions are conceptualized along 
a left-right continuum, an increase in economic ideology is a move to the right; an increase in 
anti-internationalism is a move away from international engagement. The thin lines in Figures 
2 and 3 provide 95% confidence bands, calculated using the formula for the variance of a sum 
of random numbers (Friedrich 1982, 810). The shaded histograms provide the in-sample 
distribution of the conditioning variable. Figure 4 reports the results from the simulated pro-
internationalist governments with 95% confidence bounds; Figure 5, of anti-internationalist 
governments.  
Hypothesis 1a: Non-Status Quo Aid  
In our first hypotheses (H1a and H1b), we predict left-international governments will 
increase aid to disaster relief and non-status quo actors. The first panels in Figures 2 and 3 
display the pertinent marginal effects.. Our model shows that, in the short-term, moving to the 
right associates with greater allocations of non-status quo aid if the party also becomes more 
internationalist. Further, a change towards anti-internationalism decreases such aid 
allocations, only if the government also becomes more economically conservative. These 
findings do not perfectly fit expectations. Our logic regarding need-based aid led us to 
hypothesize that pro-international leftist governments would be the ones to increase aid to 
                                                          
26 &KDQJHVLQWKHLQGHSHQGHQWYDULDEOHVRFFXULQWKHǻDQWL-LQWHUQDWLRQDOLVPDQGǻHFRQRPLFLGHRORJ\YDULDEOHVLQ
the first round, and lagged values of these variables in the second round. Subsequent changes in allocations stem 
from updated lagged dependent variables, reflecting the predicted difference from previous rounds.   
27 See appendix for simulation details. 
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non-status quo actors. We find instead that internationalist parties of the right boost this type 
of aid. Decreasing allocations to non-status quo actors when parties shift to the right on both 
dimensions, though, meshes with our perspective. 
<<<Figure 3 Here>>> 
 Figure 4 plots the predicted aid allocations from our simulated election of pro-
internationalist parties. The predicted effects soften results regarding this hypothesis. In the 
first round of our simulation, the right internationalist government significantly increased aid 
to non-status quo actors; the similarly internationalist, but economically liberal, government 
decreased the allocation. The short-term effect for the left parties, though, falls well short of 
statistical significance. In subsequent years, our model shows the right internationalist 
government reversing its allocation pattern. Within three years, subsequent cuts canceled out 
the first round's increase. The long-term effect for left-pro-international donors is positive, 
and marginally significant (at Į :KHQWKHVLPXODWHGHOHFWLRQEULQJVDQWL-
internationalist parties to power (see Figure 5), the pattern for right governments reverses:  a 
large decrease is offset by subsequent additions. For the left government that eschews 
engagement with the international community, though, predicted changes in allocation never 
differ significantly from zero. 
Hypothesis 1b: Disaster Assistance 
 The third columns in our figures evaluate the effects on disaster aid. Short-term effects 
are barely significant in this regression. Natural disasters occur stochastically, but are more 
likely to accumulate over the course of a government's tenure than to cluster in the first year; 
the effect of preferences plays out over the long term. The steep slope of its marginal effects 
indicates that the internationalism dimension strongly conditions economic ideology's long-
term effect. A more conservative government that is also internationalist allocates less money 
to disaster aid. On the parochial side, however, conservative governments appear more 
generous in this form of aid. Examining the other side of the interaction effect, we see that the 
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significant results pertain entirely to the leftist side of economic ideology. Consistent with 
H1b, the effects show that parochial leftist parties assign less of this form of aid. Figure 4's 
third panel contains the predicted outcomes for this model. In the long-run, a pro-
internationalist left government spends more on disaster assistance while right-
internationalists make no significant changes. Figure 5 shows the alternate election results, 
with anti-internationalist governments coming to power. Here we see the strong significant 
marginal effect of economic ideology playing out:  on the anti-internationalist side, left and 
right governments behave very differently. The long-run cuts of left-anti-internationalist 
governments are deeper than the increased allotments by conservatives. 
<<<Figure 4 Here>>> 
<<<Figure 5 Here>>> 
 
Hypothesis 2a: Budget Support 
 Our second set of hypotheses predict that conservative internationalist governments 
increase aid that signals backing for a government through budget support (H2a) or grows 
H[WHUQDOPDUNHWVIRUWKHFRXQWU\¶VJRRGV+EContradictorily, we find that economic 
ideology never significantly affects allocations to budget support (see second panels in Figure 
2). In the long-term, though, anti-internationalism negatively affects it if combined with leftist 
ideology (see Figure 3). The pattern is clearer in Figure 5. The parochial leftist government 
slashed budget aid after taking office, while its rightist counterpart made no significant 
adjustments.  
 We interpret this evidence as supportive of our theory, if not the specific wording of 
H1b. While rightist governments do not boost budget support, they also refrain from cutting it 
even if they become opposed to international entanglement. The long-term decrease in such 
aid by left-anti-internationalist governments is reasonable:  budget aid is easily perceived as a 
potentially corrosive or unequitable means of redistributing wealth.  
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Hypothesis 2b: Trade Factors and Infrastructure 
We employ two dependent variables to assess whether right-internationalist 
governments pursue economic advantage by bolstering new markets for their countries' 
exports. Results across these two regressions mirror each other quite closely, as we expected 
they would. For both types of aid, a shift to the right of the economic spectrum decreases 
allocations by moderately anti-internationalist governments in the short term, but the limited 
range of significance for this marginal effect raises doubts about its validity. The most similar 
set of effects across the two models can be seen in the long-term marginal effects of anti-
internationalism. These suggest that parochialism is associated with lower aid allocations by 
leftist governments. The predicted effects illustrate the estimated changes in allocations over 
time. Pro-internationalist parties rarely differ from each other in their decisions regarding aid 
for trade (see Figure 4). In the trade factors model, our simulation suggests a short-term 
decrease in aid by far-left internationalist governments, but with very broad confidence bands.  
Figure 5, showing hypothetical anti-internationalists, reveals the significant effects. Here, we 
see significant, long-term reductions in trade-boosting aid by leftist parties. 
Together, these results suggest that if a difference in preferences for these types of aid 
exists, it exists only for anti-internationalist governments. The inefficiency in predicted 
outcomes for pro-internationalist governments, though, may be due to noise in our 
measurement scheme. Perhaps the expected patterns of trade-boosting aid surface only in the 
subset of states with a history of purchasing donors' exports. Testing this more refined 
hypothesis requires a dyadic data structure, and thus lies outside the bounds of this analysis. 
 
Controls 
Many of the control variables also perform as predicted. Cabinets controlling a larger 
percentage of the lower house of parliament increase budget aid in the short-term, presumably 
due to easier policy making. This logic also explains presidentialism's negative, though 
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insignificant, coefficients for most sectors. Presidential systems require greater compromise 
due to additional institutional veto points (Tsebelis 2002). More fractionalized cabinets, those 
with a greater effective number of cabinet parties, only have a negative short-term effect on 
budget aid. Coalitions with more parties face difficulties agreeing on common foreign policy 
reforms, particularly in relation to aid sectors intended to influence the behavior of 
governments more directly. Greater left-leaning seat share (Social Democrat and 
Communists) has no consistent long- or short-term effect (contrasting Therién and Noëll's 
logic). YHWWKHODFNRIDGGLWLRQDOHIIHFWVIURPLGHRORJ\EH\RQGWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VLV
unsurprising; our more nuanced measurement of WKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VSRVLWLRQDFFRXQWVIRU
SDUWLHV¶LGHRORJ\  
  
Discussion 
 'RPHVWLFSROLWLFDOSUHIHUHQFHVDQGFRQVWUDLQWVDIIHFWDFWRUV¶FKRLFHVDQGFDSDFLWLHVLQ
international politics (Putnam 1988, Whitten and Williams 2011). Research on donor state 
preferences often makes overly strong simplifying assumptions, masking interesting variation 
both in donor preferences and in foreign aid. Considering only the left-right dimension of 
economic ideology lumps together governments with dissimilar goals. Despite arguments in 
the literature to the contrary, we contend that parties with liberal domestic preferences will not 
necessarily believe that excess wealth generated by their economy should be transferred to the 
less fortunate abroad. Similarly, governments with conservative ideology may not scorn 
foreign aid as a soft-hearted waste of resources. Indeed, we find that a conservative economic 
ideology rarely leads to reduced aid, even when combined with anti-internationalism.  
Foreign aid offers a IOH[LEOHWRRORIIRUHLJQSROLF\0HDVXULQJGRQRUV¶³DLGHIIRUW´
simply by allocations as a proportion of available resources obscures the myriad purposes of 
economic assistance. Benevolent pursuit of economic justice is not the only motivation behind 
foreign aid. Because dRQRUVXVHDLGLQSXUVXLWRIPDQ\GLIIHUHQW³UHWXUQs´FRQVHUYDWLYH
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JRYHUQPHQWVLQWHUHVWHGLQSURPRWLQJWKHLUFRQVWLWXHQWV¶LQWHUHVWVDEURDGILQGUHDVRQs to 
increase aid as well. %URDGO\JRYHUQPHQWV¶LGHRORJLFDOJRDOVcorrespond to varied forms of 
foreign aid. 
We find support for our expectations that left-right preferences condition the aid 
allocation patterns of regimes. Left governments give disaster aid generously, but are 
markedly less enthusiastic about nearly everything else. Right governments may be less 
sensitive to swings in the internationalism dimension, a sign that conservative governments 
more consistently value influence over others.  
Despite earlier work's focus on left-right politics, internationalism matters. Left-anti-
international governments, for example, reduce aid to the type of economic projects 
championed by left-pro-international parties. In the case of trade-focused aid, economic 
ideology manages only to blunt the stronger role of parochialism for conservative 
governments.  
Turning to policy implications, potential recipients should tailor aid requests to the 
political profile of the donor governments for maximum leverage. As this logic suggests, 
though, politicization of aid may seriously threaten its overall development mission. Donor 
state policy-makers who prefer that aid focus on need and impact could benefit from built-in 
external commitment mechanisms, such as employing multinational or non-governmental 
agencies to ensure consistent, long-term funding (McGillivray and Pham 2015). Decisions 
regarding oversight and implementation of aid programs may also reflect changes in donor 
JRYHUQPHQWV¶SUHIHUHQFH.  
More broadly, we further efforts to bridge the divide between the concepts and 
theories championed by comparative politics and those emphasized in international relations. 
The last decades brought an explosion of theory that privileges domestic politics in explaining 
international outcomes, yet too many models still employ extreme simplifying assumptions, 
boiling domestic politics down to regime-type binaries, leaders down to survival-motivations. 
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The perspective forwarded here takes seriously policy preferences, and variations therein, 
across democratic polities. In doing so, we tie electoral motivations to policy preferences, and 
these preferences to variation in foreign policy.     
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Table 1. Summary of Partisan Ideology Across Dimensions 
 RILE 
Internationalism Left Right 
Pro 
Government intervention in the 
economy is necessary to avoid 
injustice. 
The country should seek to engage 
with the international community, 
carrying the goal of economic 
justice forward. 
The market is the most efficient way 
to foster economic well-being. 
The country should establish ties 
with the international community in 
order to further its interests abroad.  
Anti 
Government intervention in the 
economy is necessary to avoid 
injustice. 
The country should make better use 
of its resources, focusing on 
providing for its own people rather 
than wasting resources propping up 
corrupt regimes abroad.  
The market is the most efficient way 
to foster economic well-being. 
The country should withdraw from 
entanglements abroad which erode 
sovereignty and cause inefficiency. 
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Table 2. Summary of Theoretical Expectations 
 RILE 
Internationalism Left Right 
Pro 
Increasingly generous aid in the 
face of disasters. 
Increasing aid to non-status quo 
actors inside recipients. 
Increasing budget support. 
Increasing allocation of aid to 
programs increasing recipients' 
viability as trade partners. 
Anti 
Decreasing allocation of aid, 
especially to sectors favored by 
the right. 
Decreasing allocation of aid, 
especially to sectors favored by the 
left. 
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Table 3. Summary of Findings by Hypothesis 
Hypotheses Empirical Effect 
/HIWJRYHUQPHQWVGHGLFDWHPRUHDLGWR«  
H1a) Disaster Relief  Long term  
H1b) Non-Status Quo Groups Contrary to expectations, short-term increase for 
rightist governments; marginally significant long-
term increase for leftist governments. 
  
5LJKWJRYHUQPHQWVGHGLFDWHPRUHDLGWR«  
H2a) Budget Support Long-term decrease for anti-internationalist left 
governments; no significant effect for right 
governments. 
H2b) Trade Factors Long-term decrease for anti-internationalist left-
governments; no significant effect for right 
governments. 
H2b) Economic Infrastructure  Long-term decrease for anti-internationalist left-
governments; no significant effect for right 
governments. 
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Table 4. ECM Regressions by Aid Sector  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Non Status 
Quo 
Budget 
Support 
Disaster 
Assistance 
Trade 
Factors 
Econ 
Infrastructure 
ǻ$QWL-Internationalism -0.874*** 
(0.297) 
-0.396 
(0.592) 
-0.064 
(0.531) 
0.670* 
(0.407) 
-0.063 
(0.455) 
Anti-Internationalismt-1 
-0.285 
(0.217) 
-0.292 
(0.458) 
0.250 
(0.420) 
-0.154 
(0.324) 
-0.201 
(0.386) 
ǻ RILE 0.016 
(0.022) 
0.039 
(0.048) 
-0.022 
(0.040) 
0.024 
(0.038) 
-0.011 
(0.042) 
RILE t-1 
-0.010 
(0.015) 
0.070* 
(0.037) 
0.093*** 
(0.030) 
0.071*** 
(0.026) 
0.075** 
(0.035) 
ǻ$QWL-Internationalismൈ 
ǻRILE 
-1.776*** 
(0.655) 
-1.010 
(1.291) 
-1.908* 
(1.081) 
-1.005 
(0.952) 
-1.611 
(1.057) 
Anti-Internationalismt-1ൈ 
RILEt-1 
-0.127 
(0.190) 
0.797* 
(0.479) 
1.144*** 
(0.384) 
0.500 
(0.305) 
0.528 
(0.377) 
Cold War 
-0.008 
(0.016) 
0.021 
(0.049) 
-0.047 
(0.056) 
0.070 
(0.058) 
0.022 
(0.075) 
Real GDPt-1 
0.002 
(0.012) 
0.044** 
(0.021) 
0.031* 
(0.018) 
0.013 
(0.018) 
0.003 
(0.016) 
% Left Party Family Seatst-1 
-0.003 
(0.026) 
0.051 
(0.065) 
0.047 
(0.048) 
0.062 
(0.050) 
0.080 
(0.053) 
% Christian Dem Seatst-1 
-0.033 
(0.033) 
-0.136** 
(0.065) 
0.059 
(0.061) 
-0.006 
(0.047) 
0.011 
(0.053) 
% Cabinet Seats t-1 
0.058 
(0.057) 
0.203 
(0.139) 
0.062 
(0.125) 
0.041 
(0.118) 
0.062 
(0.117) 
EN Cabinet Partiest-1 
-0.003 
(0.007) 
-0.009 
(0.013) 
0.000 
(0.010) 
0.006 
(0.010) 
-0.003 
(0.012) 
ǻ5HDO*'3 0.150 
(0.218) 
0.086 
(0.375) 
-0.153 
(0.354) 
-0.147 
(0.299) 
-0.200 
(0.345) 
ǻ% Left Party Family Seats -0.092 
(0.102) 
0.081 
(0.236) 
0.093 
(0.194) 
0.063 
(0.164) 
0.073 
(0.208) 
ǻ% Christian Dem Seats 0.029 
(0.131) 
-0.106 
(0.286) 
0.505* 
(0.269) 
0.501* 
(0.276) 
0.479 
(0.344) 
ǻ% Cabinet Seats  -0.008 (0.082) 
0.502*** 
(0.187) 
0.024 
(0.164) 
0.137 
(0.153) 
0.149 
(0.159) 
ǻEN Cabinet Parties 0.019 
(0.015) 
-0.057* 
(0.033) 
0.040 
(0.028) 
0.013 
(0.019) 
-0.008 
(0.023) 
Presidential System 
-0.025 
(0.104) 
-0.235 
(0.149) 
-0.118 
(0.141) 
-0.077 
(0.117) 
0.003 
(0.104) 
Aid Allocated t-1 
-0.599*** 
(0.053) 
-0.270*** 
(0.037) 
-0.211*** 
(0.040) 
-0.114*** 
(0.026) 
-0.103*** 
(0.031) 
Constant 
0.003 
(0.033) 
-0.007 
(0.075) 
0.078 
(0.071) 
0.024 
(0.067) 
0.046 
(0.079) 
Observations 896 896 896 896 896 
R-squared 0.321 0.140 0.111 0.076 0.063 
Root Mean Squared Error 0.174 0.366 0.312 0.287 0.323 
Note: Panel-corrected standard errors reported in parentheses. Number of donors is 28. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 1. Distribution of Government Preferences across Dimensions 
 
Note: utilizes the mean coalition or legislature position. 
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Figure 2. Long and Short-Term Effect of Economic Ideology on Aid Allocation 
 Note:  Marginal effect is the partial derivative of the linear index with respect to the variable of 
interest. Thin lines provide 95% confidence bands calculated using the formula for the variance of a 
sum of random numbers and an assumption or Normal distribution. Shaded histograms provide in-
sample distribution of the conditioning variable. 
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Figure 3. Long and Short-Term Effect of Economic Ideology on Aid Allocation 
 Note:  Marginal effect is the partial derivative of the linear index with respect to the variable of 
interest. Thin lines provide 95% confidence bands calculated using the formula for the variance of 
a sum of random numbers and an assumption or Normal distribution. Shaded histograms provide 
in-sample distribution of the conditioning variable. 
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Figure 4. Results from Simulation of Pro-International Election Winners 
Note: Quantities charted are mean differences in allocations from simulated sampling distribution of 
100,000 estimates in each sector. Vertical bars provide 95% confidence bands based on that 
distribution. For details of simulation procedure, please refer to text, page 20-21.  
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Figure 5. Results from Simulation of Anti-International Election Winners 
Note: Quantities charted are mean differences in allocations from simulated sampling distribution of 
100,000 estimates in each sector. Vertical bars provide 95% confidence bands based on that 
distribution. For details of simulation procedure, please refer to text, page 20-21. 
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Descriptive Statistics 
Table A1. Descriptive Statistics for all Included Covariates and Dependent Variables 
Variable 
 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max Observations 
Aid to Non-SQ Actors overall 0.07 0.19 0.00 1.48 N = 896 
 
between 
 
0.06 0.00 0.20 n = 28 
 
within 
 
0.18 -0.13 1.39 T-bar = 32 
         Budget Aid overall 1.04 1.53 0.00 6.37 N = 896 
 
between 
 
1.12 0.00 4.24 n = 28 
 
within 
 
1.03 -3.20 4.56 T-bar = 32 
         Disaster Assistance overall 0.99 1.27 0.00 5.95 N = 896 
 
between 
 
0.85 0.00 2.72 n = 28 
 
within 
 
0.97 -1.73 4.78 T-bar = 32 
         Trade Factors Aid overall 2.01 1.84 0.00 6.61 N = 896 
 
between 
 
1.67 0.00 5.23 n = 28 
 
within 
 
0.88 -3.22 4.61 T-bar = 32 
         Econ Infrastructure Aid overall 2.22 1.99 0.00 7.16 N = 896 
 
between 
 
1.64 0.00 5.00 n = 28 
 
within 
 
1.25 -2.77 4.99 T-bar = 32 
         Economic Ideology overall -0.67 0.58 -2.75 0.36 N = 896 
 
between 
 
0.36 -1.51 -0.19 n = 28 
 
within 
 
0.45 -2.11 0.70 T-bar = 32 
         Anti-Internationalism overall -0.05 0.05 -0.32 0.08 N = 896 
 
between 
 
0.03 -0.13 -0.01 n = 28 
 
within 
 
0.04 -0.27 0.07 T-bar = 32 
         Real GDP overall 0.92 1.93 0.00 13.19 N = 896 
 
between 
 
1.73 0.01 8.92 n = 28 
 
within 
 
0.63 -3.09 5.20 T = 32 
         % Left Seats overall 0.26 0.22 0.00 0.69 N = 896 
 
between 
 
0.20 0.00 0.59 n = 28 
 
within 
 
0.12 -0.19 0.60 T-bar = 32 
         % Christian Democrat 
Seats 
overall 0.14 0.17 0.00 0.73 N = 896 
between 
 
0.16 0.00 0.45 n = 28 
 
within 
 
0.06 -0.06 0.46 T-bar = 32 
         % Cabinet Seats overall 0.55 0.10 0.11 0.89 N = 896 
 
between 
 
0.06 0.38 0.65 n = 28 
 
within 
 
0.08 0.17 0.88 T-bar = 32 
         EN Cabinet Parties overall 1.69 0.86 1.00 5.48 N = 896 
 
between 
 
0.78 1.00 4.04 n = 28 
 
within 
 
0.44 -0.20 5.37 T-bar = 32 
         Presidential System overall 0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00 N = 896 
 
between 
 
0.19 0.00 1.00 n = 28 
 
within 
 
0.00 0.04 0.04 T-bar = 32 
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Table A2. List of Donors in Sample 
Donor N Percent 
United States of America 38 4.24 
Canada 32 3.57 
Great Britain 37 4.13 
Ireland 38 4.24 
Netherlands 38 4.24 
Belgium 38 4.24 
Luxembourg 38 4.24 
France 38 4.24 
Spain 34 3.79 
Portugal 33 3.68 
Germany 38 4.24 
Poland 17 1.9 
Austria 38 4.24 
Hungary 17 1.9 
Slovak Republic 13 1.45 
Italy 35 3.91 
Greece 37 4.13 
Estonia 19 2.12 
Latvia 12 1.34 
Lithuania 7 0.78 
Finland 38 4.24 
Sweden 38 4.24 
Norway 33 3.68 
Denmark 38 4.24 
Iceland 38 4.24 
Japan 38 4.24 
Australia 38 4.24 
New Zealand 38 4.24 
Total 896 100 
 
Simulation Details 
The simulation procedure allows us to demonstrate the over-time effects of a shift in 
these dimensions, while also facilitating assessment of substantive and statistical significance. 
Specifically, the simulations proceed as follows: 
 
1. Estimate an ECM model, preserving the parameter matrices. 
2. Draw a vector of 100 coefficients from the multivariate Normal distribution 
defined by the estimated coefficient vector and variance-covariance matrices. 
3. Calculate the starting value, ଴ܻ෡  as ࢄ૙ࢼ෡, using mean or modal values as appropriate 
for the lag and change values of controls, lagged dependent variable at in-sample 
average, lagged values of each preference dimension at in-sample averages, and 
change variables at zero. 
4. Replace lagged dependent variable with ଴ܻ෡ Ǥ 
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5. Calculate the change in aid allocation enacted by each new government in the first 
year in office, ௥ܻǡ௔ǡଵ෣ , as ࢄ௥ǡ௔ǡଵࢼ෡. Here, r indexes the change in economic ideology, 
and a indexes the change in anti-internationalism. The values used for r and a are 
reflected in the change values of the preference dimensions in this round.  
6. Replace lagged dependent variable with ௥ܻǡ௔ǡଵ෣ . 
7. Calculate the subsequent years' predicted changes, ௥ܻǡ௔ǡଶ෣ .. Lagged values of the 
preference dimensions are set to the mean + r and mean + a. Change values are set 
to zero.  
8. Repeat steps 6 and 7 for t = 3, 4, 5, setting the lagged DV to ௥ܻǡ௔ǡ௧ିଵ෣ . 
9. Repeat Steps 1-8 for each dependent variable, for the following conditions: 
a. Left-Pro-Internationalist: ሺݎ ൌ െ ?ߪǡ ܽ ൌ െ ?ߪሻ 
b. Right-Pro-Internationalist: ሺݎ ൌ ൅ ?ߪǡ ܽ ൌ െ ?ߪሻ 
c. Left-Anti-Internationalist: ሺݎ ൌ െ ?ߪǡ ܽ ൌ ൅ ?ߪሻ 
d. Right-Anti-Internationalist: ሺݎ ൌ ൅ ?ߪǡ ܽ ൌ ൅ ?ߪሻ 
 
To adequately reflect uncertainty around the predicted outcomes from our simulations, we 
repeat the simulation procedure 100 times, drawing a random set of 100 coefficients from the 
parameter matrices of the ECM regressions each time. This simulated sampling distribution of 
100,000 predicted outcomes allows us to calculate 95% confidence intervals. We do so using 
the standard Normality assumption and associated Z-scores of 1.96.  
Operationalizing Preference Dimensions using PM or President  
2XUWKHRU\SRVLWVDQLQWHUDFWLYHHIIHFWEHWZHHQWZRGLPHQVLRQVRIJRYHUQPHQWV¶SUHIHUHQFHV
economic ideology and internationalism. The preferences of a government can be operationalized in 
multiple ways. Our main analysis acknowledges the potential moderating effect of coalition politics in 
parliamentary systems and legislative checks in presidential systems by employing the average 
preference position of either the coalition or of the legislature. Table A2 reports the results of an 
alternative strategy. In this set of Error Correction Models (ECMs), we use the party of the prime 
minister or president to operationalize preferences. The two means of aggregating preferences are 
quite similar to each other. In each dimension, the correlation across measures exceeds .89. Figure A1 
demonstrates this relationship graphically.  The main difference is coverage:  with coalition and 
legislatures as the measured unit we achieve a much higher N. The loss of cases stems from 
technocratic and independent prime ministers.  
Theoretically, we would expect this alternative measurement to be less useful than the one 
based on coalition and legislature means. In presidential systems, mid-term elections introduce a 
change in the second measure, but not the first. Similarly, if an election in a parliamentary system 
QHFHVVLWDWHVWKDWWKH30¶VSDUW\IRUPDQHZFRDOLWLRQRQHPHDVXUH will move and the other will 
remain static. Moreover, in most donor countries the budget will be subject to legislative approval, not 
just executive action. Therefore, the outcome should more closely reflect mean legislative preferences 
than simply the exHFXWLYHSDUW\¶VSRVLWLRQV 
 
Figure A1. Correlation across Measurement Strategies for Government Preferences 
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Note:  in economic ideology r= 0.8969; in anti-internationalism, r=0.8990. 
 
 
Table A2. ECM Regressions across Aid Sector using PM/President Preferences 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Non Status 
Quo 
Budget 
Support 
Disaster 
Assistance 
Trade 
Factors 
Econ 
Infrastructure 
ǻ$QWL-Internationalism -0.431 -0.719 -0.688 0.372 -0.132 
(0.312) (0.544) (0.462) (0.275) (0.266) 
Anti-Internationalismt-1 
-0.297 -0.284 0.353 0.142 0.074 
(0.238) (0.406) (0.338) (0.180) (0.191) 
ǻ RILE -0.011 0.088 0.043 0.009 0.033 
(0.029) (0.058) (0.042) (0.036) (0.033) 
RILE t-1 
-0.022 0.023 0.055* 0.022 0.011 
(0.021) (0.046) (0.033) (0.027) (0.028) 
ǻ$QWL-Internationalismൈ ǻ 
RILE 
0.136 -0.420 0.435 0.677 0.136 
(0.788) (1.244) (1.045) (0.716) (0.755) 
Anti-Internationalismt-1ൈ 
RILE -1 
-0.329 0.496 0.909*** 0.463* 0.358 
(0.203) (0.501) (0.345) (0.239) (0.289) 
Cold War 
-0.014 -0.008 -0.099*** 0.066*** -0.019 
(0.019) (0.035) (0.029) (0.025) (0.019) 
Real GDPt-1 
-0.000 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
% Left Party Family Seatst-1 
0.004 0.044 0.020 0.054 0.074 
(0.034) (0.079) (0.059) (0.053) (0.051) 
% Christian Dem Seatst-1 
-0.011 -0.194* 0.102 -0.004 0.020 
(0.057) (0.102) (0.092) (0.060) (0.055) 
% Cabinet Seats t-1 
0.104 0.270 0.053 0.017 0.021 
(0.072) (0.185) (0.153) (0.114) (0.105) 
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EN Cabinet Partiest-1 
-0.006 -0.011 -0.003 0.006 -0.008 
(0.009) (0.016) (0.012) (0.011) (0.014) 
ǻ5HDO*'3 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ǻ% Left Party Family Seats -0.114 -0.182 -0.017 -0.049 -0.080 
(0.128) (0.249) (0.192) (0.116) (0.136) 
ǻ% Christian Dem Seats 0.330 -1.118* 0.255 0.476 -0.020 
(0.280) (0.592) (0.500) (0.470) (0.418) 
ǻ% Cabinet Seats 0.024 0.609** -0.103 0.025 0.002 (0.121) (0.266) (0.216) (0.166) (0.151) 
ǻEN Cabinet Parties 0.026 -0.085** 0.042 0.009 -0.020 
(0.020) (0.042) (0.035) (0.018) (0.023) 
Presidential System 
0.005 -0.354*** -0.177 -0.284*** -0.168*** 
(0.118) (0.135) (0.137) (0.062) (0.054) 
Aid Allocated t-1 
-0.595*** -0.279*** -0.217*** -0.159*** -0.126*** 
(0.065) (0.039) (0.032) (0.030) (0.024) 
Constant 
-0.004 0.002 0.145* 0.099 0.142* 
(0.042) (0.096) (0.080) (0.072) (0.075) 
      
Observations 650 650 650 650 650 
Number of Donors 27 27 27 27 27 
R-squared 0.299 0.159 0.121 0.095 0.080 
Root Mean Squared Error 0.202 0.378 0.293 0.227 0.223 
Note: Panel corrected standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is change in aid allocated to each 
sector. N in this analysis differs from main analysis due to inability to accurately assign preference measures for 
technocratic prime ministers in Italy.+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 Given the interaction and ECM framework, it can be quite difficult to compare results using 
just coefficient tables. Therefore, we present marginal effects plots to mirror those in the main 
document. Figures A2 and A3 contain the in-sample marginal effects for economic ideology and anti-
internationalism in turn. The results in both cases differ from our main analysis primarily in the short 
term effects. We find the largest differences in the non-status quo and economic infrastructure aid 
regressions. In our main analysis economic ideology and anti-internationalism both exert significant, 
FRQGLWLRQDOHIIHFWVLQWKHVKRUWWHUPIRUWKHVHVHFWRUV:KHQXVLQJWKHSULPHPLQLVWHURUSUHVLGHQW¶V
party preferences, we find no significant short term conditional effect for economic ideology in non-
status quo and economic infrastructure aid. In both cases, the slope of effects also changes from steep 
negatives to very shallow positives. Comparing across regressions, economic ideology and anti-
internationalism mHDVXUHGZLWKWKHKHDGRIJRYHUQPHQW¶VSDUW\¶VSUHIHUHQFHLVOHVVFRQVLVWHQWO\UHODWHG
to aid allocation in the short term. The main analysis shows a consistently negative ± though not 
always significant ± VORSHLQHFRQRPLFLGHRORJ\¶VHIIHFWDFURVVWKHYDOXes of anti-internationalism. 
This means in the primary analysis we uncover a relatively stable short term relationship in which a 
shift to the right increases aid allocation when the government is more pro-internationalist. Similarly, 
in the main analysis anti-LQWHUQDWLRQDOLVP¶VHIIHFWWKRXJKYDU\LQJLQVLJQLILFDQFHLVFRQVLVWHQWO\
negative on the right side of the economic spectrum, but not necessarily for leftist governments. 
Considering the long-term effects, one sees that this alternative measurement strategy produces 
similar, though slightly less efficient results compared to our main analysis.  
This pattern makes sense, as the correspondence between the difference measures is 
considerably weaker than that between the level measures. The first differences in economic ideology 
across measurement strategies correlate at 0.816; in anti-internationalism, at 0 .794.  
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Figure A2. Results for Economic Ideology using Alternative Measure
 
Note: marginal effects are defined as the partial derivative of the linear index with respect to the 
variable of interest. Thin bands provide 95% confidence intervals derived via the formula for the 
variance of a sum of random numbers.  
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Figure A3. Results for Anti-Internationalism with Alternative Measure 
 
Note: marginal effects are defined as the partial derivative of the linear index with respect to the 
variable of interest. Thin bands provide 95% confidence intervals derived via the formula for the 
variance of a sum of random numbers.  
 
Alternative OLS Specifications 
 We present OLS regressions using an Error Correction Model framework and panel-corrected 
standard errors to account for the structure of the data. This is not the only plausible specification, but 
it is our preferred one. Below, we provide some alternatives:  ECM with clustered standard errors, 
OLS with country-year fixed effects, a lagged dependent variable model, and a mixed effects model. 
Each of these models makes different, or strictly more stringent, assumptions about the data generating 
process than does our preferred set of ECMs.  
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Table A3. ECM Regressions by Sector, OLS with Clustered Standard Errors 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Non-
Status Quo 
Aid 
Budget 
Support 
Disaster 
Assistance 
Trade 
Factors 
Aid 
Econ 
Infrastructure 
      
ǻ$QWL-Internationalism -0.874*** -0.396 -0.064 0.670 -0.063 
(0.267) (0.574) (0.761) (0.442) (0.384) 
Anti-Internationalismt-1 
-0.285 -0.292 0.250 -0.154 -0.201 
(0.183) (0.352) (0.334) (0.276) (0.302) 
ǻ RILE 0.016 0.039 -0.022 0.024 -0.011 
(0.028) (0.060) (0.037) (0.042) (0.039) 
RILE t-1 
-0.010 0.070* 0.093** 0.071* 0.075* 
(0.015) (0.038) (0.037) (0.037) (0.041) 
ǻ$QWL-Internationalismൈ ǻ 
RILE 
-1.776*** -1.010 -1.908 -1.005 -1.611 
(0.597) (1.823) (1.860) (1.415) (2.174) 
Anti-Internationalismt-1ൈ 
RILE -1 
-0.127 0.797** 1.144** 0.500 0.528 
(0.161) (0.348) (0.481) (0.397) (0.400) 
Cold War 
-0.008 0.021 -0.047** 0.070*** 0.022 
(0.013) (0.024) (0.020) (0.018) (0.015) 
Real GDPt-1 
0.002 0.044* 0.031* 0.013 0.003 
(0.016) (0.026) (0.017) (0.018) (0.014) 
% Left Party Family Seatst-1 
-0.003 0.051 0.047 0.062 0.080 
(0.032) (0.066) (0.056) (0.043) (0.049) 
% Christian Dem Seatst-1 
-0.033 -0.136 0.059 -0.006 0.011 
(0.033) (0.084) (0.067) (0.053) (0.052) 
% Cabinet Seats t-1 
0.058 0.203 0.062 0.041 0.062 
(0.076) (0.128) (0.120) (0.082) (0.115) 
EN Cabinet Partiest-1 
-0.003 -0.009 0.000 0.006 -0.003 
(0.008) (0.017) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) 
ǻ5HDO*'3 0.150* 0.086 -0.153 -0.147 -0.200 
(0.083) (0.118) (0.166) (0.143) (0.157) 
ǻ% Left Party Family Seats -0.092 0.081 0.093 0.063 0.073 
(0.099) (0.141) (0.142) (0.122) (0.103) 
ǻ% Christian Dem Seats 0.029 -0.106 0.505 0.501 0.479 
(0.116) (0.288) (0.328) (0.353) (0.374) 
ǻ% Cabinet Seats -0.008 0.502*** 0.024 0.137 0.149 
(0.108) (0.180) (0.147) (0.124) (0.145) 
ǻEN Cabinet Parties 0.019 -0.057** 0.040* 0.013 -0.008 
(0.025) (0.026) (0.020) (0.022) (0.022) 
Presidential System 
-0.025 -0.235 -0.118 -0.077 0.003 
(0.115) (0.186) (0.107) (0.124) (0.094) 
Aid Allocated t-1 
-0.599*** -0.270*** -0.211*** -0.114*** -0.103*** 
(0.070) (0.032) (0.039) (0.033) (0.018) 
Constant 
0.003 -0.007 0.078 0.024 0.046 
(0.048) (0.059) (0.062) (0.055) (0.065) 
      
Observations 896 896 896 896 896 
R-squared 0.321 0.140 0.111 0.076 0.063 
Root Mean Squared Error 0.174 0.366 0.312 0.287 0.323 
Note: Robust standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered on donor states. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A4. OLS Regressions with Donor-Year Fixed Effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Non-Status 
Quo Aid 
Budget 
Support 
Disaster 
Assistance 
Trade Factors 
Aid 
Econ 
Infrastructure 
Anti-Internationalism 
-0.531* -0.851 1.610*** 0.189 0.244 
(0.286) (1.185) (0.465) (0.683) (0.791) 
RILE 
-0.000 -0.004 0.071 0.042 -0.051 
(0.026) (0.059) (0.089) (0.069) (0.072) 
Anti-Internationalismൈ 
RILE 
-0.183 -0.602 2.143** 0.330 -0.021 
(0.325) (0.900) (0.792) (0.789) (0.875) 
Cold War  
-0.056** -0.234*** -0.391*** 0.002 -0.445*** 
(0.024) (0.083) (0.056) (0.066) (0.071) 
Real GDP  
-0.047*** 0.016 0.089*** -0.080*** -0.071*** 
(0.014) (0.051) (0.021) (0.025) (0.025) 
% Left Party Family Seats 
-0.021 0.295 0.010 -0.064 0.012 
(0.075) (0.189) (0.242) (0.116) (0.186) 
% Christian Democrat 
Seats 
-0.052 0.459 -0.251 -0.028 -0.244 
(0.070) (0.423) (0.382) (0.403) (0.492) 
% Cabinet Seats 
0.104 0.954*** 0.212 0.044 0.148 
(0.113) (0.306) (0.261) (0.222) (0.257) 
Effective Number of 
Cabinet Parties 
-0.010 -0.040 0.041 -0.024 0.022 
(0.017) (0.037) (0.042) (0.039) (0.055) 
Constant 
0.084 -0.055 0.465** 1.000*** 1.047*** 
(0.080) (0.218) (0.184) (0.146) (0.197) 
RMSE 0.180 0.423 0.371 0.347 0.437 
R2 0.041 0.092 0.270 0.025 0.186 
N 930 930 930 930 930 
Donors 28 28 28 28 28 
Note: The Dependent variable is sector of aid. Fixed Effects for donor year. Robust standard errors are clustered 
on the country level. 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table A5. OLS Regressions by Sector with Donor-Year Fixed Effects and Lagged Dependent Variable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Non-
Status Quo 
Aid 
Budget 
Support 
Disaster 
Assistance 
Trade 
Factors Aid 
Econ 
Infrastructure 
Anti-Internationalism 
-0.455** -0.605 0.693* 0.070 -0.090 
(0.193) (0.713) (0.383) (0.372) (0.341) 
RILE 
-0.006 0.003 0.044 0.036 0.012 
(0.017) (0.027) (0.052) (0.043) (0.054) 
Anti-Internationalismൈ RILE -0.320 -0.284 0.740 -0.093 -0.233 
(0.205) (0.524) (0.699) (0.496) (0.718) 
Cold War 
-0.043** -0.070* -0.156*** 0.015 -0.082*** 
(0.016) (0.035) (0.026) (0.030) (0.025) 
Real GDP 
-0.040*** -0.002 0.001 -0.050*** -0.052*** 
(0.011) (0.023) (0.010) (0.015) (0.015) 
% Left Party Family Seats 
-0.013 0.095 0.020 0.036 0.099 
(0.053) (0.073) (0.088) (0.061) (0.074) 
% Christian Democrat Seats 
-0.017 0.123 0.079 0.129 0.122 
(0.054) (0.183) (0.167) (0.198) (0.197) 
% Cabinet Seats 
0.092 0.446** 0.126 0.095 0.141 
(0.093) (0.161) (0.159) (0.119) (0.140) 
Effective Number of Cabinet 
Parties 
-0.003 -0.026 0.023 0.004 0.009 
(0.014) (0.017) (0.022) (0.022) (0.027) 
Aidt-1 
0.327*** 0.584*** 0.634*** 0.678*** 0.773*** 
(0.085) (0.040) (0.045) (0.083) (0.023) 
Constant 
0.044 -0.036 0.153 0.252 0.156 
(0.052) (0.108) (0.101) (0.154) (0.115) 
Observations 908 908 908 908 908 
Number of Donors 28 28 28 28 28 
R-squared 0.149 0.380 0.526 0.386 0.577 
Root Mean Squared Error 0.170 0.349 0.299 0.274 0.313 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A6. Mixed Effects Regressions with Varying Country and Year Intercepts and Lagged 
Dependent Variable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Non-Status 
Quo Aid 
Budget 
Support 
Disaster 
Assistance 
Trade 
Factors Aid 
Econ 
Infrastructu
re 
      
RILE -0.016 0.061+ 0.060* 0.079** 0.058 
(0.012) (0.036) (0.030) (0.028) (0.037) 
Anti-Internationalism -0.323 -0.474 -0.033 -0.102 -0.412 
(0.275) (0.375) (0.443) (0.218) (0.263) 
Anti-Internationalism X 
RILE 
-0.286 0.458 0.821+ 0.342 0.192 
(0.199) (0.537) (0.498) (0.320) (0.434) 
% Cabinet Seats -0.031 0.248* 0.001 0.066 0.066 
(0.044) (0.118) (0.111) (0.110) (0.125) 
Effective Number of 
Cabinet Parties 
0.008 -0.010 0.012 0.003 -0.003 
(0.008) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) 
% Left Party Family 
Seats 
-0.010 0.067 0.032 0.090+ 0.095+ 
(0.027) (0.055) (0.049) (0.047) (0.055) 
% Christian Democrat 
Seats 
-0.018 -0.131+ 0.037 0.040 0.020 
(0.032) (0.070) (0.060) (0.062) (0.069) 
Aidt-1 0.434*** 0.701*** 0.790*** 0.890*** 0.875*** 
 (0.068) (0.033) (0.031) (0.019) (0.019) 
ǻ5HDO*'3 0.028** 0.079*** 0.048* 0.018 0.020 
 (0.011) (0.022) (0.024) (0.022) (0.023) 
presidential 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
Constant 0.014 -0.035 0.040 0.031 0.040 
 (0.031) (0.064) (0.060) (0.060) (0.068) 
      
Cabinet Level -18.762 -20.411 -3.710 -26.566 -2.897*** 
 (28.938) (18.077) (8.579) (18.760) (0.536) 
      
Donor level -19.160 -22.206 -5.792 -26.170 -3.021*** 
 (25.541) (16.438) (293.843) (23.457) (0.408) 
      
Residual -1.839*** -1.036*** -1.200*** -1.258*** -1.172*** 
 (0.158) (0.121) (0.088) (0.071) (0.075) 
AIC -704.705 692.229 413.201 306.506 500.900 
BIC -642.714 754.220 475.191 368.496 562.891 
Log-Likelihood 365.352 -333.115 -193.601 -140.253 -237.450 
N 870 870 870 870 870 
Note: The Dependent variable is sector of aid. Standard errors in parentheses  
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Sub-Sample Analysis by Cold War  
 5HVHDUFKRQIRUHLJQDLGKDVDUJXHGWKDWGRQRUV¶OHYHUDJHRYHUUHFLSLHQWVLQWKHSRVW-Cold War 
era differs qualitatively from that during the era of US-Soviet competition over client states (Bearce 
and Tirone 2010). This possibility mD\PHDQWKDWGRQRUV¶VWUDWHJLFDOORFDWLRQRIGLIIHULQJW\SHVRIDLG
may vary over these time periods as well. We do not expect this to play a major role in our analysis, 
given the broadly insignificant findings for the Cold War dummy, though. To investigate the possible 
heterogeneity across eras, we estimated our models over a split population separating cases into Cold 
War and New World Order. Our overall sample of donor years tips towards the modern era, with just 
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under 60% of cases occurring after 1990. 7KDW¶V1HZ:RUOG2UGHUDVRSSRVHGWR&ROG:DU
observations. Presenting these results concisely is difficult given the complexity of our ECM approach 
and the multitude of dependent variables. Instead of a series of lengthy coefficient tables, then, we 
calculated marginal effects for our theoretical variables and present them in Figures A4 and A5. For 
those desiring further information, Figures A6-A10 plot all coefficients across the two time periods for 
each of the dependent variables.  
 We did not formulate nuanced ex ante expectations about the applicability of our theory across 
the two eras. Generally, though, we can outline a few things which we thought would likely happen 
when separating the samples. First, we expect that breaking the sample up should, overall, decrease 
the efficiency of estimates due to smaller N. Second, if anything, we would expect that variation in 
government ideology would matter less in an era more constrained by bipolar politics. For most 
regressions, splitting the sample does seem simply to decrease efficiency. In the budget aid regression, 
for example, all coefficients generally fall on the same side of the zero line, and point estimates for 
HDFKHUDIDOOZLWKLQWKHRWKHU¶VFRQILGHQFHLQWHUYDO$LGWRQRQ-status quo actors and economic 
infrastructure aid also feature this pattern when broken up over the two samples. The only model 
where point estimates seem to really significantly differ across eras is the trade factor aid equation. 
Here, the interaction term for short-term effects is very large, negative and significant in the Cold War 
sample. In the New World Order years, the interaction term falls short of significance, but is positively 
signed. Interestingly, this suggests that for this form of aid, the two dimensions of preferences 
conditioned each-other's effects more strongly during the Cold War.  
Our second expectation, that models for the Cold War would indicate a smaller role for also 
ideology fares well. In some cases, the Cold War era effects seem to be more intense. This is 
particularly the case for trade factors aid, where results are very strong and significant for both 
economic ideology and internationalism. In three of the regressions, long-term effects for anti-
internationalism appear to be more strongly conditioned by economic ideology during the Cold War 
than during the New World years. 
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Fig A4. Results for Economic Ideology in Analysis Split by Era 
 
Note: marginal effect is defined as the partial derivative of the linear index with respect to the 
variable of interest. Thin black lines and vertical grey spikes give the 95% confidence intervals 
derived via the formula for the variance of a sum of random numbers. The histograms provide 
the in-sample distribution of the conditioning variables for each era. Shaded grey for the Cold 
War and black for the New World Order. We define Cold War as any year before 1991.  
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Figure A5. Results for Anti-Internationalism in Analysis Split by Era 
  
Note: marginal effect is defined as the partial derivative of the linear index with respect to the 
variable of interest. Thin black lines and vertical grey spikes give the 95% confidence intervals 
derived via the formula for the variance of a sum of random numbers. The histograms provide 
the in-sample distribution of the conditioning variables for each era. Shaded grey for the Cold 
War and black for the New World Order. We define Cold War as any year before 1991. 
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Figure A6. Coefficient Plot for Subsample Analysis of Non-Status Quo Aid 
 
Note: Horizontal bands depict 90% confidence intervals as this is the broadest level of confidence 
which we accept as significant in this analysis.  
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Figure A7. Coefficient Plot for Subsample Analysis of Budget Aid 
 
Note: Horizontal bands depict 90% confidence intervals as this is the broadest level of confidence 
which we accept as significant in this analysis.  
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Figure A8. Coefficient Plot for Subsample Analysis of Disaster Assistance 
 
Note: Horizontal bands depict 90% confidence intervals as this is the broadest level of confidence 
which we accept as significant in this analysis.  
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Figure A9. Coefficient Plot for Subsample Analysis of Trade Factor Aid 
 
Note: Horizontal bands depict 90% confidence intervals as this is the broadest level of confidence 
which we accept as significant in this analysis.  
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Figure A10. Coefficient Plot for Subsample Analysis of Economic Infrastructure Aid 
 
Note: Horizontal bands depict 90% confidence intervals as this is the broadest level of confidence 
which we accept as significant in this analysis.  
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Alternate Measures of Ideology (RILE) 
 
'XHWRWKHSRWHQWLDOWKDWWKHFRQWHQWRIWKH5,/(VFDOHDJJUHJDWHVSDUWLHV¶JRDOVIURPDUDQJHRILVVXHV
there is some concern that the left-right measure captures positions on issues that are more tangential 
WRSDUWLHV¶EURDGOHIW-riJKWLGHRORJ\6FKRODUVLQRWKHUVHWWLQJVKDYHUHPRYHGRU³SXUJHG´WKLVPHDVXUH
of potentially offending issues to avoid these sorts of complications (e.g. Tavits 2007; Hellwig 2012; 
Williams et al. 2016). Following this approach, we create two alternate indicators of left-right policy 
goals. The first removes all references to international politics used in the CMP codebook. For our 
coalition government indicator, these measure correlates highly with the original scale (0.735). These 
measures should be highly correlated as differences on economic redistribution historically formed the 
core of the left-right dimension in most western democracies (e.g. Lipset and Rokkan 1960). The 
second measure purges all "non-economic" content, creating a measure that only reports parties' 
positions on the most well-known aspects of the left-right dimension. This also correlates closely with 
the original RILE (0.894). We then perform our analysis using these indicators. Unsurprisingly then, 
the results closely mirror those presented in the main analysis, although with losses in efficiency. 
 We present the predicted effects from this analysis in Figure A11-A14. The results for the 
international-purged measure closely match those found in the main analysis. The primary exception is 
that the reduced variance on the RILE measure means the coefficients have slightly smaller values. 
The confidence intervals have slightly greater overlap as well. However, these results suggest that the 
HIIHFWRISDUWLHV¶SRVLWLRQVRQWKHPRVWLPSRUWDQt dimension of conflict is not driven solely by their 
left-right positions on topics related to foreign policy.  
Similar patterns hold, as well, for the economic-purged RILE score. This measure, though, as 
it excludes a broader array of content, is considerably less efficient than either the original or the 
international-purged RILE measures.  
 
Table A7. ECM Regressions by Sector with the International-Purged version of RILE. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Non-SQ 
Budget 
Support 
Disaster 
Assistance Trade Factors 
Econ 
Infrastructure 
ǻ$QWL-Internationalism -0.736** -0.303 -0.140 0.768+ -0.018 
(0.284) (0.579) (0.518) (0.412) (0.465) 
Anti-Internationalismt-1 
-0.210 -0.769* -0.487 -0.379 -0.471 
(0.159) (0.359) (0.327) (0.247) (0.314) 
ǻ5,/( 0.009 0.027 0.036 0.002 -0.005 
(0.023) (0.054) (0.044) (0.042) (0.048) 
RILEt-1 
0.016 0.095* 0.141*** 0.106** 0.100** 
(0.021) (0.044) (0.037) (0.032) (0.038) 
ǻ Anti-Internationalism 
X ǻ RILE 
-1.595** 0.290 -1.500 -0.813 -1.744+ 
(0.555) (1.156) (0.983) (0.808) (0.934) 
Anti-Internationalismt-1 
X RILEt-1 
0.269 0.663 0.958* 1.002* 0.735 
(0.304) (0.629) (0.465) (0.422) (0.476) 
Cold War 
-0.011 0.031 -0.036 0.085 0.036 
(0.016) (0.048) (0.053) (0.058) (0.074) 
ǻ5HDO*'3 0.145 0.029 -0.269 -0.147 -0.230 
(0.219) (0.369) (0.348) (0.293) (0.341) 
ǻ/HIW3DUW\)DPLO\
Seats 
-0.089 0.076 0.154 0.046 0.092 
(0.101) (0.232) (0.193) (0.164) (0.208) 
ǻ&KULVWLDQ'HP6HDWV 0.090 -0.081 0.527* 0.522+ 0.497 
(0.130) (0.281) (0.265) (0.270) (0.337) 
ǻ&DELQHW6HDWV -0.009 0.515** 0.032 0.132 0.135 
(0.083) (0.189) (0.168) (0.155) (0.163) 
ǻ(1&DELQHW3DUWLHV 0.022 -0.058+ 0.038 0.015 -0.006 
(0.015) (0.033) (0.029) (0.020) (0.024) 
Real GDPt-1 
0.003 0.037+ 0.022 0.014 0.002 
(0.012) (0.021) (0.018) (0.017) (0.016) 
% Left Party Family 
Seatst-1 
0.003 0.068 0.074 0.064 0.082 
(0.025) (0.065) (0.048) (0.050) (0.054) 
% Christian Dem Seatst-1 -0.019 -0.146* 0.055 -0.017 -0.002 
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(0.034) (0.061) (0.059) (0.044) (0.050) 
% Cabinet Seatst-1 
0.067 0.211 0.075 0.039 0.063 
(0.056) (0.140) (0.126) (0.119) (0.119) 
EN Cabinet Partiest-1 
-0.003 -0.010 -0.003 0.006 -0.004 
(0.007) (0.013) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) 
Presidential System 
-0.021 -0.187 -0.059 -0.071 0.012 
(0.104) (0.143) (0.136) (0.104) (0.092) 
Aidt-1 
-0.598*** -0.271*** -0.213*** -0.117*** -0.105*** 
(0.053) (0.037) (0.039) (0.026) (0.031) 
Constant -0.001 -0.050 0.023 -0.019 0.003 
 (0.033) (0.075) (0.068) (0.066) (0.077) 
RMSE 0.174 0.365 0.311 0.287 0.323 
X2 150.001 71.489 49.622 40.840 27.966 
N 896 896 896 896 896 
 
 
Figure A11. Pro-Internationalist - Purged Left-Right positions 
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Figure A12. Anti-Internationalist ± Purged Left-Right positions 
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Table A8. ECM Regressions by Sector with the Only Economic, Purged Version of RILE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Non-SQ 
Budget 
Support 
Disaster 
Assistance Trade Factors 
Econ 
Infrastructure 
ǻAnti-Internationalism -0.736** -0.229 0.011 0.842* 0.112 
(0.283) (0.586) (0.520) (0.425) (0.483) 
Anti-Internationalismt-1 
-0.210 -0.802* -0.365 -0.386 -0.410 
(0.156) (0.356) (0.328) (0.250) (0.316) 
ǻ5,/( 0.011 0.012 0.014 -0.014 -0.037 
(0.025) (0.057) (0.047) (0.045) (0.052) 
RILEt-1 
0.001 0.087+ 0.079+ 0.065+ 0.065 
(0.025) (0.052) (0.045) (0.036) (0.041) 
ǻ Anti-Internationalism 
X ǻ RILE 
-1.389+ 1.814 1.335 0.032 0.145 
(0.777) (1.359) (1.242) (1.049) (1.187) 
Anti-Internationalismt-1 
X RILEt-1 
-0.028 0.603 -0.416 0.258 -0.123 
(0.359) (0.821) (0.667) (0.535) (0.626) 
Cold War 
-0.008 0.036 -0.021 0.091 0.046 
(0.016) (0.048) (0.053) (0.058) (0.074) 
ǻ5HDO*'3 0.106 0.083 -0.248 -0.146 -0.222 
(0.222) (0.377) (0.352) (0.300) (0.344) 
ǻLeft Party Family 
Seats 
-0.077 0.079 0.157 0.057 0.081 
(0.102) (0.234) (0.195) (0.167) (0.212) 
ǻ&KULVWLDQ'HP6HDWV 0.079 -0.115 0.467+ 0.494+ 0.499 
(0.138) (0.285) (0.269) (0.270) (0.339) 
ǻ&DELQHW6HDWV 0.003 0.496** 0.022 0.120 0.129 
(0.082) (0.188) (0.166) (0.154) (0.163) 
ǻ(1&DELQHW3DUWLHV 0.020 -0.057+ 0.034 0.013 -0.010 
(0.015) (0.033) (0.028) (0.019) (0.023) 
Real GDPt-1 
0.003 0.038+ 0.022 0.013 0.002 
(0.012) (0.020) (0.017) (0.016) (0.014) 
% Left Party Family 
Seatst-1 
0.004 0.068 0.072 0.062 0.085 
(0.026) (0.064) (0.048) (0.050) (0.055) 
% Christian Dem Seatst-1 
-0.026 -0.163** 0.011 -0.043 -0.033 
(0.032) (0.059) (0.056) (0.043) (0.049) 
% Cabinet Seatst-1 
0.058 0.201 0.059 0.030 0.053 
(0.056) (0.139) (0.125) (0.118) (0.118) 
EN Cabinet Partiest-1 
-0.002 -0.005 0.003 0.010 0.001 
(0.007) (0.013) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) 
Presidential System 
-0.015 -0.203 -0.049 -0.072 0.017 
(0.103) (0.142) (0.137) (0.105) (0.092) 
Aidt-1 
-0.600*** -0.270*** -0.208*** -0.112*** -0.103*** 
(0.053) (0.037) (0.039) (0.026) (0.031) 
Constant 0.002 -0.068 0.004 -0.031 -0.014 
 (0.035) (0.078) (0.070) (0.069) (0.080) 
RMSE 0.175 0.365 0.311 0.288 0.323 
X2 143.708 69.917 47.627 36.620 29.777 
N 896 896 896 896 896 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
63 
 
Figure A13. Pro-Internationalist Governments, Only Economic RILE 
 
 
Figure A14. Anti-Internationalist Governments, Only Economic RILE 
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Seemingly Unrelated Error Correction Model  
 
Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) following an Error Correction Framework offers an 
alternate modeling choice to the panel corrected standard errors we use in the main analysis. SUR 
models allow for the errors to correlate between multiple dependent variables in compositional data. 
Although we argue that aid budgets are likely not determined in mass, but individually based on the 
goals of the government, a SUR approach might account for any correlation in the errors if aid budgets 
are decided as a fixed sum and then each aid category were decided as proportions (i.e. Aid is 
DOORFDWHGIURPDµIL[HGSLH¶3KLOLSV5XWKHUIRUGDQG:KLWWHQ,QVXFKFLUFXPVWDQFHVDFKDQJH
in one spending category may constitute an un-modeled influence on the other categories. A SUR 
framework accommodates this data structure by allowing the error terms across regressions to 
correlate, essentially acknowledging that factors which lurk in the error terms across dependent 
variables may move together.  
Following this perspective, we run the analysis (Table A9) using a SUR ECM framework. The 
results reveal similar patterns, but with smaller confidence intervals. As graphically demonstrated in 
Figure A14, the basic results match those from our key findings. Aid to Non-SQ groups and Disaster 
Aid reveal long term positive effects from left international governments. These effects reverse for 
anti-international left governments (Figure A15). Like our main analysis, the predicted effects of pro-
international right governments overlap with zero for Budget, Trade factors and Economic 
infrastructure aid.  
These models provide some additional useful information that help to explain the difference 
between these results and those from a more standard ECM approach. Intriguingly, the results suggest 
mixed levels of correlation in the residuals. Analysis of the residuals reveals that the Trade Factors and 
Economic Infrastructure are the most highly correlated aid types and the residuals for Budget Aid and 
Disaster Aid correlates with these models as well. Aid to Non-Status quo groups is the most 
independent model. These cross-model correlations may explain the somewhat different evidence for 
the Trade Factors and Economic Infrastructure Aid types.  
Yet, if the distribution of funds to aid categories is determined somewhat independently, then 
an exogenous common process such as preferences that lead to changes in aid may lead to surprising 
relates if the dependent variables are not compositional in nature. Given the reduction in standard 
errors in the SUR ECMs, we believe that the ECMs with panel corrected standard errors presented in 
the text are a more difficult test of the theory and better reflect the proposed theoretical mechanism.   
 
Table A9. Seemingly Unrelated Regression Estimates 
      
 
Non-SQ Groups Budget Support 
Disaster 
Assistance Trade Factors 
Econ 
Infrastructure 
ǻ$QWL-Internationalism -0.879*** -1.265 -0.609 1.366 -0.857 
(0.256) (1.200) (1.011) (1.039) (1.258) 
Anti-Internationalismt-1 
-0.293 -0.957 1.027 -0.949 -0.912 
(0.190) (0.886) (0.743) (0.765) (0.925) 
ǻ5,/( 0.015 0.085 -0.063 0.019 -0.082 
(0.022) (0.103) (0.086) (0.089) (0.107) 
RILEt-1 
-0.011 0.157+ 0.237*** 0.203** 0.259** 
(0.018) (0.083) (0.070) (0.072) (0.087) 
ǻ Anti-Internationalism 
X ǻ RILE 
-1.769*** -3.262 -4.541* -3.439 -5.719* 
(0.521) (2.442) (2.053) (2.105) (2.555) 
Anti-Internationalismt-1 
X RILEt-1 
-0.131 1.605 3.480*** 1.609+ 2.483* 
(0.216) (1.014) (0.873) (0.880) (1.068) 
Cold War 
-0.008 0.055 -0.149** 0.299*** -0.027 
(0.013) (0.062) (0.053) (0.056) (0.065) 
ǻ5HDO*'3 0.152 0.133 -0.522 -0.082 -0.412 
(0.115) (0.537) (0.452) (0.465) (0.563) 
ǻ/HIW3DUW\)DPLO\
Seats 
-0.092 0.049 0.328 0.003 0.038 
(0.097) (0.455) (0.383) (0.393) (0.477) 
ǻ&KULVWLDQ'HP 0.030 -0.246 1.252+ 0.949 1.436 
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Seats (0.185) (0.869) (0.730) (0.749) (0.909) 
ǻ&DELQHW6HDWV -0.008 1.187** 0.073 0.176 0.234 
(0.096) (0.449) (0.377) (0.387) (0.470) 
ǻ(1&DELQHW3DUWLHV 0.019 -0.137+ 0.089 0.042 -0.001 
(0.016) (0.073) (0.061) (0.063) (0.076) 
Real GDPt-1 
0.002 0.099** 0.128*** 0.126*** 0.131*** 
(0.007) (0.035) (0.030) (0.032) (0.038) 
% Left Party Family 
Seatst-1 
-0.003 0.132 0.163 0.162 0.356* 
(0.030) (0.140) (0.117) (0.120) (0.147) 
% Christian Dem Seatst-
1 
-0.034 -0.355* 0.160 -0.111 -0.049 
(0.037) (0.176) (0.147) (0.151) (0.183) 
% Cabinet Seatst-1 
0.058 0.592+ 0.090 -0.053 0.040 
(0.070) (0.332) (0.276) (0.285) (0.345) 
EN Cabinet Partiest-1 
-0.003 -0.039 0.008 0.021 -0.016 
(0.008) (0.036) (0.030) (0.031) (0.038) 
Presidential System 
-0.026 -0.306 -0.522* -0.778** -0.716* 
(0.062) (0.291) (0.252) (0.265) (0.317) 
Aidt-1 
-0.609*** -0.278*** -0.281*** -0.198*** -0.219*** 
(0.030) (0.021) (0.021) (0.015) (0.016) 
Constant 0.003 -0.081 0.195 0.159 0.351+ 
 (0.040) (0.188) (0.158) (0.163) (0.199) 
AIC 6850.619     
BIC 7330.413     
Root Mean Squared 
Error 
0.172 0.808 0.680 0.705 0.857 
Ȥ2 445.535 189.604 205.966 206.993 218.616 
Log-Likelihood -3325.309     
N 896     
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Figure A15. Pro-Internationalist Governments, SUR results 
 
 
Figure A 16. Anti-Internationalist Governments, SUR results 
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Error Correction Models with Country Fixed Effects 
Despite the logic expressed above, regarding the wisdom of combining ECM and country fixed 
effects, we present a combination model below. As we would expect given that much of the variance 
in our outcome variable occurs within rather than across units, and our quite comprehensive slate of 
substantive controls, incorporating country dummies introduces considerable multicollinearity, 
without explaining much more variance in the outcome. The result is inflated standard errors, but little 
to no change in the coefficient estimates. 
 
Table A10. Error Correction with Country Fixed Effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Non-SQ Budget Support Disaster Assistance Trade Factors Econ Infrastructure 
ǻ$QWL-Internationalism -0.935** -0.291 0.127 0.652 0.011 
 (0.299) (0.607) (0.524) (0.417) (0.468) 
Anti-Internationalismt-1 -0.264 -0.401 0.809+ -0.061 -0.053 
 (0.247) (0.517) (0.474) (0.380) (0.460) 
ǻ5,/( 0.019 0.028 -0.033 0.023 -0.012 
 (0.022) (0.049) (0.040) (0.039) (0.043) 
RILEt-1 0.002 0.031 0.075* 0.060+ 0.055 
 (0.018) (0.047) (0.036) (0.032) (0.040) 
ǻ Anti-Internationalism 
X ǻ RILE 
-1.863** -1.043 -1.874+ -0.782 -1.422 
 (0.645) (1.269) (1.054) (0.939) (1.059) 
Anti-Internationalismt-1 X 
RILEt-1 
-0.102 0.347 1.066* 0.141 0.203 
 (0.248) (0.561) (0.455) (0.370) (0.455) 
Cold War -0.042* -0.064 -0.155* 0.021 -0.082 
 (0.019) (0.052) (0.065) (0.059) (0.085) 
ǻ5HDO*'3 0.053 -0.009 -0.222 -0.307 -0.348 
 (0.215) (0.391) (0.355) (0.297) (0.345) 
ǻ/HIW3DUW\)DPLO\
Seats 
-0.096 0.062 0.057 0.023 0.063 
 (0.106) (0.229) (0.195) (0.167) (0.210) 
ǻ&KULVWLDQ'HP6HDWV 0.054 -0.007 0.414 0.494+ 0.450 
 (0.135) (0.285) (0.268) (0.277) (0.343) 
ǻ&DELQHW6HDWV 0.037 0.568** 0.074 0.130 0.160 
 (0.085) (0.188) (0.164) (0.153) (0.165) 
ǻ(1&DELQHW3DUWLHV 0.011 -0.060 0.041 0.005 -0.001 
 (0.017) (0.036) (0.030) (0.021) (0.026) 
Real GDPt-1 -0.038* 0.005 0.005 -0.046* -0.048+ 
 (0.019) (0.031) (0.026) (0.023) (0.026) 
% Left Party Family 
Seatst-1 
-0.021 0.117 0.008 0.063 0.128 
 (0.057) (0.095) (0.091) (0.067) (0.089) 
% Christian Dem Seatst-1 -0.078 0.149 -0.020 0.037 0.036 
 (0.125) (0.229) (0.194) (0.181) (0.203) 
% Cabinet Seatst-1 0.129 0.371* 0.168 0.073 0.136 
 (0.081) (0.170) (0.146) (0.149) (0.154) 
EN Cabinet Partiest-1 -0.012 -0.004 0.021 0.007 0.021 
 (0.014) (0.030) (0.025) (0.018) (0.023) 
Presidential System 0.293 0.290 0.342 0.821*** 0.658* 
 (0.183) (0.300) (0.240) (0.232) (0.270) 
Aidt-1 -0.668*** -0.415*** -0.363*** -0.319*** -0.227*** 
 (0.054) (0.049) (0.059) (0.059) (0.063) 
Country Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
      
Constant 0.059 -0.064 0.075 0.056 0.062 
 (0.053) (0.102) (0.092) (0.095) (0.114) 
RMSE 0.172 0.357 0.304 0.280 0.320 
X2 214.487 132.410 82.821 66.146 57.900 
N 896 896 896 896 896 
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Figure A 17. Pro-Internationalist Governments, ECM with donor country fixed effects. 
 
Figure A 18. Anti-Internationalist Governments, ECM with donor country fixed effects. 
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Panel-Summarized Descriptive Statistics 
Table A11. Descriptive Statistics across and within Panels 
Variable 
 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
Aid to Non-SQ Actors overall 0.0885 0.2973 0.0000 3.4111 N = 981 
 between  
0.0904 0.0000 0.3075 n = 28 
 within  
0.2835 -0.2190 3.2367 T-bar = 35 
Budget Support overall 0.9875 1.5013 0.0000 6.3670 N = 981 
 between  
1.1186 0.0000 4.2402 n = 28 
 within  
1.0046 -3.2527 4.4742 T-bar = 35 
Disaster Aid overall 0.9339 1.2545 0.0000 5.9537 N = 981 
 between  
0.8369 0.0000 2.6481 n = 28 
 within  
0.9516 -1.7142 4.7486 T-bar = 35 
Trade Factors overall 1.9127 1.8388 0.0000 6.6148 N = 981 
 between  
1.6631 0.0007 5.2346 n = 28 
 within  
0.8742 -3.3219 4.5684 T-bar = 35 
Econ. Infrastructure overall 2.1018 1.9877 0.0000 7.1625 N = 981 
 between  
1.6280 0.0000 4.9544 n = 28 
 within  
1.2311 -2.8527 4.8927 T-bar = 35 
Anti-Internationalism, 
Prime Minister 
overall -0.0490 0.0538 -0.3184 0.1257 N = 927 
between  
0.0315 -0.1403 -0.0088 n = 28 
 within  
0.0432 -0.2776 0.1145 T-bar = 33 
Anti-Internationalism, 
Coalition 
overall -0.0506 0.0494 -0.3191 0.2134 N = 937 
between  
0.0311 -0.1264 -0.0104 n = 28 
 within  
0.0377 -0.2689 0.1989 T-bar = 33 
RILE, prime minister overall -0.2081 0.4743 -1.5073 0.9465 N = 923 
between  
0.2829 -0.9209 0.3171 n = 28 
 within  
0.3839 -1.5041 1.0737 T-bar = 33 
RILE, coalition overall -0.2345 0.4476 -1.4937 0.9465 N = 933 
 between  
0.2608 -0.9429 0.1931 n = 28 
 within  
0.3663 -1.4615 0.9503 T-bar = 33 
Real GDP (millions 
2009 US$) 
overall 1310.0 2240.0 5.2235 14400.0 N = 687 
between  
1870.0 7.3602 9420.0 n = 27 
 within  
764.0 -2730.0 6300.0 T = 25 
Left % Seats overall 0.2539 0.2269 0.0000 0.7848 N = 981 
 between  
0.1926 0.0000 0.5865 n = 28 
 within  
0.1268 -0.1847 0.9273 T-bar = 35 
Christian Dem % 
Seats 
overall 0.1335 0.1673 0.0000 0.7333 N = 981 
between  
0.1555 0.0000 0.4601 n = 28 
 within  
0.0570 -0.0599 0.4834 T-bar = 35 
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Cabinet % Seats overall 0.5511 0.1074 0.0000 0.9500 N = 981 
 between  
0.0638 0.3709 0.6543 n = 28 
 within  
0.0852 0.0459 0.9339 T-bar = 35 
Effective Number of 
Cabinet Parties 
overall 1.7023 0.8750 1.0000 5.4814 N = 978 
between  
0.7235 1.0000 4.0295 n = 28 
 within  
0.4992 -0.1321 5.3931 T-bar = 35 
 
